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Edition 01 : 24 June, 2011.

Edition 02 :  08 August, 2011.

Edition 03 (revised) : 12 September, 2011.

Edition 05 : 09 February, 2013.

 

(VERSION EN FRANÇAIS PAS DISPONIBLE)

 

Summaries of monetary reform papers by L.F. Manning published at http://www.integrateddevelopment.org

 

NEW Capital is debt.

 

NEW Comments on the IMF (Benes and Kumhof) paper “The Chicago Plan Revisited”.

 

DNA of the debt-based economy.

General summary of all papers published.(Revised edition).

How to create stable financial systems in four complementary steps. (Revised edition).

How to introduce an e-money financed virtual minimum wage system in New Zealand. (Revised edition) .

How to introduce a guaranteed minimum income in New Zealand. (Revised edition).

Interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts. (Revised edition).

Manifesto of 95 principles of the debt-based economy.

The Manning plan for permanent debt reduction in the national economy.

Missing links between growth, saving, deposits and GDP.

Savings Myth. (Revised edition).

Unified text of the manifesto of the debt-based economy.

Using a foreign transactions surcharge (FTS) to manage the exchange rate.

 

 

(The following items have not been revised. They show the historic development of the work. )

 

Financial system mechanics explained for the first time. “The Ripple Starts Here.”

Short summary of the paper The Ripple Starts Here.

Financial system mechanics: Power-point presentation. 

 

THE SAVINGS MYTH

 By Lowell Manning:  manning@kapiti.co.nz . VERSION 7, 04 September, 2011  

 

We are almost blind when the metrics on which action is based are ill-designed or when they are not well understood.[1]

 

Key Words:  accumulated current account deficit, CPI, current account deficit, debt, debt model, debt growth, deposit interest, domestic credit, exponential debt growth, E-notes, Fisher equation, foreign debt, inflation, national accounts, NFL, revised Fisher Equation, saving, savings, SNA, systemic inflation, unearned income.

 

CONTENTS:

 

01. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

02. BACKGROUND.

03. THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS.

04. THE CURRENT ACCOUNT PROCESS.

05. CAPITAL FLOWS AND THE PURCHASE OF CAPITAL GOODS.

06. CHANGES IN INVENTORIES (STOCK).

07. “SAVINGS” THAT DO NOT QUALIFY UNDER THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS.

08. RE-EVALUATING AND CORRECTING NET SAVINGS AND RELATED ENTRIES IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

10. CONCLUSION.

11. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

APPENDIX 1. DERIVATION OF SAVINGS FUNCTION FROM THE STEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS.

APPENDIX 2. COMMENT ON THE NEW ZEALAND SAVINGS WORKING GROUP  (SWG) REPORT TO NEW ZEALAND MINISTER OF FINANCE JANUARY 2011.

Page

 

 

 

 

01. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

This paper reviews the nature of saving in a debt-based economy and the System of National Accounts (SNA) used internationally to represent national economic outcomes.

 

The most important account in the SNA system [2] is the Gross domestic product (GDP) and expenditure account.  In New Zealand, that is Table 1.1 of the National Accounts. The trade balance (“balance on external goods and services”) appears as an “expenditure” item on that account. On the income (GDP) side of the SNA account the positive trade balance of an exporting country forms part of the “Gross operating surplus”. The positive trade balance represents the income value of export production that has not yet been sold abroad. The firms that produced the goods and services still own them. When the goods and services included in the positive trade balance are sold and the foreign exchange formalities related to their sale have been completed as described in sections 4 and 5 of this paper, the income received for them is spent to buy foreign capital goods. This is described in section 4. The income received from the production of the exported goods and services in the exporting country forms part of its GDP. When it is used to buy capital goods in another country, that income is permanently transferred abroad.

 

 [1] Stiglitz et al 2009 p. 9.

[2] See United Nations, 2009. The appendices set out the order of the SNA tables.

 

A trade surplus swaps domestic consumption goods and services for foreign capital assets

 

The “gross operating surplus” used in a country’s national income and outlay account (Table 1.2 of the national accounts) must reflect the final net figure from the Gross domestic product and expenditure account after taking into account the purchase of foreign assets to satisfy the balance on external goods and services.

 

The forced purchase of foreign capital assets resulting from a positive trade balance reduces the real growth in the domestic economy of the exporting country compared to what it otherwise would be, because there are fewer consumption goods and services left to buy there and no corresponding domestic incomes to buy them with. 

 

A positive balance of trade therefore tends to be a negative domestic growth factor in the exporting country at large and a positive growth factor for that country’s business interests.

 

An increase in the trade balance should be deducted from the presently measured domestic growth of the exporting country because it does not properly reflect the real growth of its domestic economy. There is no such thing as an “export-led recovery” because a positive balance of trade does nothing in aggregate to improve the well-being of consumers in the exporting country.  Potential economic growth in the exporting country is swapped for foreign capital assets that narrowly benefit business interests instead of those of the wider community. The national accounting effect is to reduce domestic credit and deposits below what they would otherwise have been.

 

The “Saving” presently shown as a residual in the National income and outlay account [3] of the National accounts prepared under the international System of National Accounts is a myth.  It does not satisfy the fundamental orthodox economic principle of Saving equals Investment where “investment” is defined as productive investment in new capital goods.

 

[3] For example Table 1.2 of the New Zealand National Accounts published by the NZ Department of Statistics.

 

The debt model referred to in the introduction (Section 2) of this paper shows that the production and purchase of capital goods takes place within the productive sector of the economy. The process is discussed at length in Section 5 of this paper and illustrated at Figure 2. To comply with orthodox theory the SNA National income and outlay account must comply with equation (1) in the paper, namely:

 

S  =  DI – C                                                                                              (1)

 

Where:

 

Saving S in equation (1) equals the transfer of productive income from income earners to the purchasers of new capital goods within the productive economy,

 

DI is disposable income from the National income and outlay account, and

 

C is final consumption expenditure also taken from the National income and outlay account.

 

For S to satisfy equation (1) it must equal gross capital formation as stated in the SNA less the principal repayments being made on existing capital goods. S is not a residual as the present national accounts claim. It is a real number based on the sale price of capital goods produced over any period of time and the principal loan repayment schedules required by lenders during the same period. When the Saving S, as it is defined above, is entered into the “use of income” side of the National income and outlay account, the account, in its present form, no longer balances.

 

The National income and outlay account fails to balance for four reasons:

 

(a) because it includes the current account balance on one side only of the account, and

(b) it includes the full value of inventory changes that have little real value, and

(c) it is based on depreciation (a wealth statistic used for taxation purposes) instead of the financial cash flow in the economy represented by principal repayments, and

(d) the residual gross operating surplus is the figure from the gross domestic product and expenditure account before taking account of foreign assets purchased abroad to satisfy the balance on external goods and services as discussed above.

 

Taking each of the four reasons in turn:

 

(a) The first reason. This paper shows that the “balance on the external current account” (CA) is primarily a capital account item even though it forms part of the National income and outlay account of the SNA. CA includes the balance on external goods and services, net compensation of employees from the rest of the world, net investment income from the rest of the world and net current transfers from the rest of the world [4]. If the current account balance CA is included as national income on the income side of the national income and outlay account, the same sum must be recorded as “non-productive investment abroad in capital goods” in the “Use of income” side of the account because CA is not Saving in the orthodox sense of equation (1). The corresponding entries required on each side of the national income and outlay account are positive for creditor countries and negative for debtor countries. This conclusion is analysed in Section 4. 

 

In a creditor country with a current account surplus, consumption goods are consumed offshore and there may also be interest income and profits remitted to the creditor country from its debtor countries. The resulting incomes are spent by the productive sector of the creditor economy to purchase capital goods offshore to satisfy the foreign exchange mechanism. This leaves less of the gross operating surplus shown on the gross domestic product and expenditure account of the creditor country for new gross fixed capital formation as already described above, effectively reducing total incomes there.

 

In a debtor country with a current account deficit, the surplus imported consumption goods are consumed through the creation of new domestic debt. Interest payments and other remittances made by the debtor country through its current account are also funded through the creation of new domestic debt. The deposits arising from that debt are used to pay for the surplus consumption, interest and other remittances. The payments are then returned to the debtor country in exchange for capital goods or claims on capital goods that can include commercial paper such as loans to banks in the debtor country.  Those return “capital flows” satisfy the foreign exchange mechanism set out in Section 4 of this paper. The domestic debt of the debtor country increases [5]. There is a corresponding increase in its domestic deposits. This increase excludes foreign exchange loans to debtor country banks that do not appear as M3 deposits in debtor country bank accounts [6]. If the net consumption, interest and profit paid by the debtor country to its foreign creditors is deemed to be negative national income in its national income and outlay account, there must be a corresponding entry on the “use of income” side of the account to reflect the loss of the debtor country’s capital goods. All that has happened is that the debtor country economy has exchanged some of its existing capital goods for consumption goods and to cover other remittances it makes to fulfil its foreign currency debts. These exchanges take place outside of its productive economy.

 

[4] For example :  As set out in Table 1.4 of the New Zealand National Accounts published by the NZ Department of Statistics.

[5] As is evident from the reconciliation of monetary and credit aggregates, for example, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Table C3 “Monetary and credit aggregates (NZ$ million)”.

[6] Refer, for example to  New Zealand Reserve bank Table C3 “Money and credit aggregates (NZ$ million).

 

 (b)  The second reason. The change in the valuation of inventory in the gross domestic product (GDP) and expenditure account of the National Accounts is discussed in Section 6. Inventory (other than “stable” inventory needed to maintain reasonable continuity of supply to consumers taking into account population growth and inflation) has little residual value. This is because it must either be discounted at a cost to future sales or it must lead to a reduction in future production. Either production levels are maintained and goods and services are sold at a lower price, or the price is maintained and the quantity consumed is lower, as predicted from the Fisher Equation of exchange [7]. In most circumstances a growing inventory represents a future “cost” rather than an “investment”, which is one reason inventories are kept to a minimum in modern industrial management. 

 

Much of the change in inventory “value” now registered in the SNA accounts is being “double counted” in the GDP. This is because the corresponding incomes that would have been needed to buy the inventory have either been siphoned off into non-productive “saving” (referred to below) or they have been used to subsidise other consumption prices. Non-productive “saving” and subsidies for consumption prices use up the incomes that would have purchased the spare inventory.  When that is properly taken into account, current production [8]  has not been discounted enough to clear the market. As a first approximation, the value of the change in inventory has been set at zero for the purposes of this paper. That reduces the residual “Gross operating surplus” in the Gross domestic product and expenditure account [9], and, therefore the National Disposable Income (DI) [10] by the same amount.

 

(c)  The third reason. To align with basic theoretical principles of saving and investment, “Consumption of fixed capital” in the national income and outlay account [11] must be replaced by the cash flow figure “repayments of principal”. The cash flow figure represents the outstanding loan debt on existing capital goods that is retired during the period to which the account refers.

 

 

 (d)   The fourth reason. The “Balance of external goods and services” is part of the current account balance. Section 4 shows that the surplus consumption goods making up the balance on external goods and services are “swapped” for capital goods. When the current account items are placed together on the “income” side of the National income and outlay account an equal and opposite entry “non-productive investment abroad in capital goods” must be placed on the “use of income” side of the National income and outlay account. In that case, a new entry “less the balance on external goods and services” is required on the income side below the existing entry “gross operating surplus”.

 

Inclusion of the “Balance of external goods and services” in the SNA calculation of GDP means that the economic growth figures provided in official statistics are invalid. This is because they reflect a change of foreign ownership abroad rather than a change in the domestic economy. They are unsuitable as a basis for deciding domestic economic policy. Figure 7 suggests that domestic growth in New Zealand has been systematically underestimated during some periods and overestimated in others.

 

The changes proposed in this paper bring the “use of income” and “income” sides of the National income and outlay account [12] into alignment as discussed in Section 8 of the paper. In summary it becomes:

 

Use of income :

 

=  Final consumption C.

+  Purchase abroad of non-productive capital investment goods (=CA).

+  Saving for productive investment S.                                                                                                                                                                                     (18)                           

 

Income :

 

=  GDP

+  Current account balance (CA).

less the balance on external goods and services.

less repayments of principal on outstanding productive investment.                                                                                                                                 (19)

 

Figure 7 provides a comparison of the National Disposable Income (DI) corrected as proposed above and the DI as shown in the existing national accounts for New Zealand from March 1962 to March 2010.  It suggests a serious overestimation of New Zealand’s National income since 2005 despite the offsetting influence of the external balance on trade and services shown in Figure 8 [13].

 

The SNA National capital account [14] needs to be restructured too. The capital assets bought by a creditor country to settle its current account imbalance are added to its “capital accumulation”. They are funded by new debt in the debtor country. The “finance of capital accumulation” in the SNA capital account  [15] becomes almost meaningless. Domestic growth is swapped for foreign assets.

 

[12] Ibid Table 1.2.

[13] Figure 7 is indicative and subject to recalibration. It is presently based on principal repayments being 1.23 x the depreciation figures given in the existing National accounts except for 1990-1993 when 1.6 x depreciation has been assumed and from 2001 to 2006 when 1.1 x depreciation has been assumed. Figure 8 hints that the model DI curve should be above the official DI curve, but it is not.

[14] See for example Table 1.3 of the New Zealand National Accounts published by Statistics New Zealand.

[15] Ibid Table 1.3.

 

The process of production and consumption in the productive economy, wherever it takes place and however its phases of production and consumption are shared amongst nations, is self-cancelling.

 

Assets purchased by a creditor country from a debtor country are already “fully paid” by the creation of new debt in the debtor country. If double entry bookkeeping is retained in the capital account, the entry on the capital accumulation side would need to be “Purchase abroad of non-productive capital investment goods” and the entry on the finance of capital accumulation side would be an equal sum labelled  “Sale of surplus consumption goods and receipts of interest, profits and other current transfers on the current account”.

 

Conceptually, therefore, there is no such thing as foreign debt. There is only foreign ownership

 

A debtor country with an accumulated current account deficit is “owned” by foreigners in the proportion the total deficit bears to the debtor country’s productive asset base [16].

 

Saving trends are discussed in Section 5 and the key findings are presented in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 plots principal repayments as a proportion of gross capital formation (GCF) in New Zealand. There has been a structural decline in Saving S as it is defined and used in this paper. This is clear when the residual “Saving” figure in the existing format of the National Accounts [17] is replaced by the revised Saving S as described above. Figure 5 shows the revised Saving S as proposed in this paper as a proportion of GDP.  It shows that the trend line of Saving S as a proportion of GDP and, with it, productive investment, has declined from 12% of GDP in 1962 to 4% in 2010.

 

Section 5 shows that the decline in Saving for productive investment in New Zealand is structural. 

 

A primary cause of the decline in Saving for productive investment is the rise of average depreciation rates over time. This is shown in Figure 4. According to the second order polynomial trend line of Figure 4, capital repayments have increased in New Zealand from about 40% of gross capital formation (GCF) in 1962 to 90% of GCF in 2010, leaving little over for net new investment in capital goods. Rising depreciation rates produce higher short-term business profit and lower investment and growth. Business has choked off growth for short-term gains (profits) that increase share prices and dividends for shareholders and deliver higher bonuses to business executives.

 

The dire conclusion from this paper is that Saving for productive investment and real GDP growth as measured using the international System of National Accounts cannot be restored to modern developed economies unless the protocols around depreciation are altered, bank lending polices and regulations reviewed and the serious distortions in the SNA records themselves are corrected.

 

The final major issue of this paper, discussed in Section 7, relates to the nature of  “saving” that does not qualify as Saving S for productive investment. Examples of this kind of  “saving” in New Zealand are the “Cullen” National Superannuation Fund and the Kiwisaver programme [18]. In New Zealand, “savings” in non-productive schemes like those referred to above cannot legally be invested in new production.

 

The productive economy is self-cancelling. GDP is produced using only a small amount of debt. The debt used for production is estimated to be less than 5.5 % of GDP in New Zealand [19]. Section 7 shows that efforts to increase non-productive “savings” like the “Cullen” Fund and the Kiwisaver scheme amount to economic suicide. This is especially true of debtor countries with current account deficits. Whatever the social objectives might be, promoting non-productive “savings” in countries like New Zealand displays fundamental ignorance of the nature of saving in a debt-based economy. Figure 6, which refers to the Kiwisaver scheme, shows how “savings” programmes not used for productive purposes hit business and household incomes and lead to reduced investment, lower consumption and poor economic performance [20].

 

[16] A wealth base could also be used depending on what ownership comparison is being made.

[17] For example Table 1.2 of the New Zealand National Accounts published by Statistics New Zealand.

[18] Details of these funds including their annual reports are readily available by searching “NZ [name of fund]” on the internet.

[19] See paper  “The DNA of the debt-based economy.” The debt issued to generate the GDP has increased as a proportion of GDP over time as the cash-based economy has been replaced with a debt-based economy.

[20] See also Kerin, 2009.

 

Savings” programmes like the “Cullen” Fund and the Kiwisaver scheme in New Zealand are funded from:

 

(a)   Deposits in the form of unearned income paid as interest on banking system  deposits  (Ms in the debt model referenced in this paper)

(b)  Deposits arising from the sale of domestic assets to foreigners (Dca in the debt model referenced in this paper)

(c)  Increased consumer debt where consumers are enticed to maintain demand by borrowing beyond their incomes such as by the systematic transfer of productive incomes into speculative non-productive “investment” in the so-called “investment” sector or paper economy [21] (Db in the debt model referenced in this paper)

 

The manifestations of such “saving” are wage stagnation, higher unemployment and recession, and increasing inventories caused by lack of consumer demand.

 

The “investment” sector relies for financial returns on unearned income and asset inflation. Non-productive “savings” are the diametric opposite of the needs of a healthy productive economy. They are parasitic. Since they cause a transfer of funds from the productive economy to the speculative paper economy they should really be included as negative items in the national income and outlay account [23].

 

The combination of the structural decline in real productive investment, harmful “saving” and systemic error in the SNA itself is lethal to productive economic activity in industrialised countries. It shows the extent to which the savings myth has destroyed monetised human economic potential worldwide.        

 

[21] See previous papers by the author for further information: Financial system mechanics explained for the first time “The Ripple Starts Here” and The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts.

[22] Deleted.

[23] Section 8 of this paper does not yet go so far, but it does propose to include relevant capital items in the national capital account.

 

 

02.  BACKGROUND.

 

The theoretical work on which this paper is based can be found at http://www.integrateddevelopment.org  There are now seven papers and ten documents altogether :

 

00. General summary of all papers published.

01. Financial system mechanics explained for the first time. “The Ripple Starts Here.” 

02. How to create stable financial systems in four complementary steps.

03. How to introduce an e-money financed virtual minimum wage system in New Zealand.

04. How to introduce a guaranteed minimum income in New Zealand.

05. The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts.

06. The Savings Myth.

07. The DNA of the debt-based economy.

08. Manifesto of 95 principles of the debt-based economy.

09. Unified text of the manifesto of the debt-based economy.

 

Papers 2, 5 and 7 are especially relevant to this paper. Click on the links to access them. All the work is covered by Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial Share-alike 3.0 licence. This means it is free for access, download and use on a reciprocal basis. The debt model used in this work is developed at The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts”.  That paper expands the Fisher equation of exchange to allow for the effects of using interest-bearing debt in the world’s financial systems.

 

Inflation in the debt model is systemic and is directly related to deposit interest rates. The present model calibration shows the inflation rate in New Zealand is half the average deposit interest rate before adding the recent one-off 2.5% GST increase (which is tax, not inflation, even though it appears in prices) and provided wages and incomes are increasing with inflation and capital inflows are not used for consumption. If interest rates rise, systemic inflation rises with them, but the real effect on prices during recessions is masked by business discountsMeasured consumer price inflation falls when interest rates are raised because the higher interest rates “kill” the economy, not because they kill systemic inflation.

 

Paper 5 How to create stable financial systems in four complementary steps includes a proposal to use electronic cash or E-notes  to achieve “quantitative easing”, enabling real earned savings to accumulate. Issuing E-notes is exactly what governments do when they purchase bonds from the banks except the bonds bear interest and have to be repaid with new debt. As set out in the following sections of this paper, the existing financial system based on interest-bearing debt does not allow for aggregate non-productive saving

 

In the debt model, GDP arises from the flow of the productive transaction deposits My used by the productive sector to produce goods and services, multiplied by its speed of circulation VyThe pool of transaction deposits My that funds the productive sector in the debt model must grow if the GDP is to increase. Without the issue of new debt or interest-free E-notes there can be no new GDP. Over the past several decades New Zealand’s debt has been growing much faster than its GDP because there is a structural transfer, in the form of unearned deposit interest, of productive incomes to the unproductive “investment sector” or paper economy.  The same has been happening almost everywhere else in the world. The debt model shows how that extra debt arises and how it fuels the non-productive investment sector causing asset bubbles. The use of interest-free E-notes on a wide scale instead of debt would allow interest rates to be set at very low levels, stopping asset bubbles and bringing the unproductive investment sector expansion into line with that of the productive economy. Using E-notes is more efficient than using debt. Overall, far LESS debt and fewer corresponding bank deposits would be needed using E-notes than are needed now. This is because the pool of debt Ms supporting the un-productive investment sector would grow much more slowly than it has grown in the past.

 

In relation to “saving” in the System of National Accounts (SNA), a primary ‘bible” for measuring asset prices and depreciation is the OECD Manual 2009 “Measuring Capital”, 2nd Edition”[24]. The general purpose of both the SNA and the Manual relates to measuring wealth to assist in the calculation of financial returns. That is likely to be why the SNA uses “consumption of fixed capital” based on depreciation schedules. No matter how refined those schedules are, they cannot represent the monetary flows contemplated by the National income and outlay account of the SNA. This causes an inherent contradiction in the National Accounts [25]. Lack of understanding of the nature of saving in a debt-based financial system is widespread throughout economic literature[26]. This is a core issue of this paper and especially its Section 4. Figure 5 shows how catastrophic the unjustifiable use of depreciation in the SNA has been in slowing economic growth. 

 

A main source for measurement of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position is the  “Balance of Payments Manual” Edition 6 (BPM6) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2009 [27].

 

In New Zealand, the two main approaches for estimating household “savings”, are the “asset and liability acquisitions” approach and the Household Income and Outlay (HIOA) method. The two approaches give quite different saving figures, in part because HIOA makes allowance for depreciation of household assets while the “asset and liability acquisitions” approach does not. Neither method is correct. The current debate on saving in New Zealand and elsewhere therefore needs to be better focused on basic economic theory with the aim of providing consistency and accuracy for both economic measurement and economic policy. This is what this paper sets out to do.

 

In practice, according to the debt model, deposits that migrate outside the productive economy must, in aggregate, be funded either from new bank debt or a decrease in consumption demand. Otherwise the purchase of new productive capital goods cannot be completed within the productive sector as the debt model requires [28].

 

[24] Especially Ch 5 “Depreciation or Consumption of Fixed Capital”.

[25] This becomes apparent as early as page 10 of SNA 2006, United Nations, 2008 where par. 1.63 says: The accounting rules and procedures used in the SNA are based on those long used in business accounting” while in the very next paragraphs it says that where there is a conflict between business accounting and economic theory, economic theory will take precedence. However, in practice, the National Accounts do NOT give precedence to economic theory, otherwise they would not be faulty as this paper demonstrates.

[26] Ideological “capture” of economic debate at some major universities and financial institutions may have contributed to this.

[27] The New Zealand Statistics Department is still using the previous edition (BPM5).

[28] See later discussion especially Section 7.

 

 

03. THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS.

 

Simon Kuznets worked widely on economic measurement and received a Nobel prize for his efforts in 1971. He is one of the fathers of the System of National Accounts (SNA) in use throughout the world, especially the parts relating to national income[29].

 

The work of Kuznets and others developed largely from the pioneering work of Irving Fisher [30] and was extensively used during and after World War II to help direct economic resources to where they would be most productive. The essence of the SNA is to measure both the income side and the expenditure side of monetised economic activity and compare the two.

 

Basic economics texts give remarkably little space to saving. Baumol and Blinder [31] for example devote only a couple of pages to it. At the most basic level they define Saving S as the difference between disposable income (DI) [32] and consumption expenditure C [33].  In the SNA, saving is a residual number obtained by measuring disposable income DI and consumption C, though DI itself  also contains another residual called the gross operating surplus which is used to balance the income side of GDP.

 

S  =  DI – C                                                                                                     (1)

 

This is confirmed by the section on “use of national disposable income” that forms part of the national accounts of most of the worlds’ nations [34].  Baumol and Blinder write:

 

The economy will reach an equilibrium at full employment only if the amount that consumers wish to save out of full-employment incomes is precisely equal to the amount that investors want to invest”[35].

 

According to Baumol and Blinder Savings S=Investment I “always” (Italic in text p181) [36].  Most “modern” basic economics texts including Baumol and Blinder provide circular flow diagrams of the economy that stress this interpretation.

 

[29] Among his major works: National Income and Capital Formation, 1919–1935. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1937; National Product Since 1869. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946; Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966; Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.

[30] Fisher’s well-known equation of exchange is revised in Manning op cit. to take into account the modern debt-based financial system.

[31] For example, “Economics Principles and Policy”, William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder, 4th Edition Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988.

[32] (National) Disposable Income (N) DI is not the same as Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The two are linked in the System of National Accounts (SNA) by the relationship: (N) DI = GDP+ net property and entrepreneurial income from the rest of the world -consumption of fixed capital (depreciation)  + net current transfers from the rest of the world.

[33] Baumol & Blinder op cit p 155.

[34] For example Statistics New Zealand: Consolidated Accounts of the Nation: Table 1.2 National Income and Outlay Account.

[35] Baumol & Blinder op cit p 177.

[36] The statements fail to consider the mechanics of the financial system such as credit creation and retirement, growth, debt servicing and unearned income and associated speculative investment: and they simply assume equilibrium theory.

 

Baumol and Blinder are also explicit about the definition of investment:

 

As defined in the national income accounts, investment includes only newly produced capital goods, such as machinery, factories, and new homes. It does not include exchanges of existing assets.” (emphasis in text). [37]

 

Those newly produced capital goods are produced and sold in the marketplace just like goods and services for consumption (As set out in Figures  1 to 3 and Section 7, and in the paper “The DNA of the debt-based economy.

 

For Saving to equal (productive) Investment in the SNA, it must, according to orthodox economic theory, arise from production incomes when there is “full-employment” in the economy. The theory provides little guidance on what happens in the absence of “equilibrium” or “full-employment”. 

 

The SNA National Income and Outlay account also includes “investment income from the rest of the world, net” and  “current transfers from the rest of the world, net” [38] that together make up the Current Account surplus CA if they are positive and Current Account deficit if they are negative.

 

The derivation of the Savings function from Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 in the SNA is shown in Appendix 1 (equations 2 to 13). The Savings function is shown there as equation (13) :

 

Saving S (net)          = Current account surplus (CA)

+ Gross capital formation (including increase in stocks) [39].

-  Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation).

+  Statistical discrepancy [40]                                          (13)

 

The SNA Saving S formulated that way fails to satisfy the orthodox economic conditions for saving in at least four respects [41].

 

[37] Baumol & Blinder op. cit. p. 159.

[38] NZ National Accounts Table 1.2.

[39] Gross capital formation is the same as Investment. Increase in stocks is also usually treated as investment.

[40] Required because of errors in the GDP production and expenditure estimates even though the operating surplus is itself already a residual.

[41] In the SNA itself, at United Nations, 2008, par. 9.28, p.183 saving is defined a little more loosely: “Saving represents that part of disposable income (adjusted for the change in pension entitlements) that is not spent on final consumption goods and services.” However, the economic compliance failures discussed in this paper still apply.

 

First, current account surpluses are not, for the most part, formed of saving as defined by orthodox theory. This is despite their being represented by new debt in the debtor country and by an equivalent amount of foreign assets in the creditor country. For details on the current account process see section 4 of this paper. In practice, current account surpluses in creditor countries result in non-productive “saving” outside of the domestic economy. The “saving” is funded by new debt in the foreign debtor economies. The new debt in the debtor countries is created outside of their domestic productive economies.

 

Secondly, depreciation is not a cash flow and so cannot relate to income and outlay. For details see section 5 of this paper on capital flows and the purchase of capital goods. United Nations (2008) at par. 6.240 on p. 123 makes clear that “consumption of fixed capital” in the SNA is meant to reflect the residual economic value of an asset, as distinct from its accounting depreciation. It is unclear how the residual economic value of an asset can be calculated unless actual repayments are taken into account [41] [42]. Whatever “consumption” allowance is made, it still does not represent a financial flow as the SNA itself insists is necessary. The national income and outlay account is, by definition, about income and expenditure, not about wealth.

 

Thirdly, while increases in stock are produced, they are neither investment nor saving because they have little net residual value. For details see section 6 of this paper on changes in inventories (stocks) [44]. 

 

[42] Refer United nations, 2008, par. 248-251 for further clarification.

[43] United Nations, 2008 (SNA) at par. 10.25 p.198 defines “consumption of capital: Consumption of fixed capital is the decline, during the course of the accounting period, in the current value of the stock of fixed assets owned and used by a producer as a result of physical deterioration, normal obsolescence or normal accidental damage”. This is itself evidently a wealth related definition rather than a dynamic income flow.

[44] This applies notwithstanding the valuation of stocks in the SNA, United Nations, 2008 par. 124-125, p.208

 

Fourthly and above all, Saving S is defined in Table 1.2 of the National Income and Outlay account to be Disposable Income less Consumption (equation 1) as orthodox theory requires. However, in its present form the National income and outlay account as a whole prevents Saving S from conforming to the definition required by orthodox theory.

 

The existing sequence and format of the tables making up the national accounts under the System of National Accounts can be readily accessed at Annex 2 (from page 561 onward) of the SNA protocol:

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/SNA2008.pdf  .

 

 

04. THE CURRENT ACCOUNT PROCESS.

 

While the current account (CA) can be interpreted as a form of “saving” for the creditor country, it does not automatically follow that a CA deficit can be considered a “negative saving” in the debtor country. “Negative saving” is extremely difficult to visualise. Borrowing to settle the foreign exchange transactions on the current account deficit is, by definition, “dis-saving” because it results in the sale of domestic productive assets to foreigners except to the extent domestic deposits arising from the sale of those productive assets are reinvested in new productive assets.

 

Some of those deposits could potentially qualify as productive SNA investment but most do not. That is not quite the same as in equation 13. The SNA appears to be mixing productive sector transactions with non-productive investment sector ones; thereby confusing income with wealth.

 

Foreign ownership of the assets of debtor countries is not always made public there. Its consequences are not widely advertised and its serious economic impact is poorly understood in the wider community.

 

New deposits from the creation of extra debt in the debtor country are not strictly Saving in the creditor country because they do not increase productive investment there. In the absence of the exchange (the swaps), the creditor country would face a quantum of inflation in its productive sector equal to its current account surplus.

 

The current account process is shown in Figure 1. Arguably, neither the debtor country nor the creditor country gains from current account imbalances. The creditor country spends its deposits from the sale of its surplus production and other remittances earned abroad to buy an equal “value” of assets from the debtor country. That increases the creditor country’s nominal wealth but does little for its domestic economy. If it did not purchase assets abroad there would be too much income left in circulation in the creditor country for the purchase of the goods and services left over there after exporting its production surplus. That would be inflationary, and seems to be one origin of the widespread misapprehension that creditor countries “export” inflation [45].  To avoid that, the surplus income must be re-invested abroad. That re-investment affects the creditor country’s capital account rather than Saving on its national income-outlay account. In practice exporting countries merely maintain their purchasing power status quo by means of the foreign exchange transactions. Those transactions do, however, alter the balance of consumption and investment within the domestic economies of exporting countries.

 

[45] Systemic inflation does occur indirectly in the debtor country from the increase in deposits there. This is discussed below.

 

Click here to see :  FIGURE 1 :  THE CURRENT ACCOUNT PROCESS.  (Start tracking from the red square in the lower right hand corner of Figure 1.)

 

Creditor country “investor withdrawals” shown on the lower right hand side of Figure 1 are surplus domestic deposits in the creditor country arising from the production debt used to produce the current account surplus. To avoid inflation in the creditor country those deposits are switched from domestic consumption there to foreign “investment”, through bank intermediation.

 

Much, if not most, foreign “investment” fails to qualify as productive investment as defined under the SNA. The creditor country produces those surplus goods and services. Both the production debt used to produce them and the corresponding incomes in the form of compensation of employees and gross operating surplus foreseen in the SNA exist in the domestic economy of the creditor country. The surplus goods and services are therefore part of the gross domestic product of the creditor country.  GDP has been defined as:

 

The total market value of goods and services produced in [a country] after deducting the cost of goods and services utilised in the process of production, but before deducting allowances for the consumption of fixed capital.” [46]

 

[46] New Zealand Year Book 1988/89 p. 809.

 

As shown below, a negative “balance on external goods and services” is funded by new domestic consumer debt in the importing debtor country. A positive balance on external goods and services is, in principle, exchanged for capital goods imported from debtor countries through the current account.

 

At the point of production, all incomes, whoever owns them, are deemed to be in domestic accounts. The creditor country swaps its spare production for (mostly existing) foreign capital goods produced elsewhere while the debtor country creates the same amount of new debt to buy the spare production imported from the creditor country.

 

That new debt forms part of the debtor country’s current account because there are no “spare” deposits created in the debtor country during the production phase of the imported goods.

 

Interest and profit remitted abroad as a result of foreign ownership of domestic production form part of domestic incomes in the debtor economy. When the remittances covering interest and profit are sent offshore they form part of the current account expenditure. Domestic deposits in the remitting country are reduced by the same amount. 

 

In a debt-based economy, it is not possible to both consume domestic production and pay for the remittances to foreign countries covering interest and profit because that would mean spending the same deposit twice. The cost of remittances for interest and profit payable abroad must therefore also be borrowed within the domestic economy of the debtor country to enable the value of goods and services in the debtor country, represented by the remittances, to be consumed. That adds to consumer debt in the debtor country.

 

The total new deposits in the debtor country, in principle, therefore, include all of its accumulated current account deficits.

 

The debtor country sells some of its capital goods to get back the corresponding deposits from abroad that it used to pay for the surplus imports, the remittances and the remainder of its current account deficit. That sale balances its foreign exchange position and leaves it with additional domestic deposits equal to the added consumer debt. Those deposits from the sale of capital goods do not return to those who borrowed the debt to pay for the surplus goods and services and remittances sent offshore. They finish up, instead, in the hands of those in the debtor country who have sold assets (or an indirect claim on those assets) to the creditor country to settle the current account deficit. This means the debtor country’s capital account must be reduced accordingly.

 

In Figure 1, the debtor country finishes up with the new debt that created the deposits used to buy the surplus foreign production it imports and to fund its other remittances offshore, enabling it to balance its foreign exchange position. The creditor country receives those deposits. They are then returned to the debtor country when the debtor country sells domestic assets (or bonds or commercial paper) to its foreign creditors. The repatriation of deposits from the creditor country is shown as “investor withdrawals” at the lower right hand side of Figure 1. For the foreign exchange position of the debtor and creditor countries to balance, the sale of debtor country assets (or bonds or commercial paper) MUST take place. The market price paid by the creditor country for the assets in terms of its own currency is determined by the currency exchange rate between the two countries.

 

The debtor country deposits arising from those asset sales are not inflationary as long as they are used for new productive investment within the strict terms of the SNA. If any of them were to be used for consumption there would be some consumer price (CPI) inflation in the debtor country. Deposits used to buy existing assets in the debtor country would cause inflation (such as in property prices) in the unproductive investment sector. Many of the deposits arising from the sale of capital goods by a debtor country to balance its current account are used that way, contributing to the asset inflation commonly observed there. In any case, according to the debt model, the extra deposits in the debtor country cause additional systemic inflation through the on-going payment of deposit interest on the extra deposits. In that indirect sense, current account deficits are always inflationary in the debtor country. The amount of inflation depends on the interest rate paid on deposits in the debtor country and the tax rate on interest income there.

 

This discussion suggests the current accounts of the world’s nations should always be balanced and there should be mechanisms in place to ensure a balance is maintained.

 

John Maynard Keynes argued for balanced trade at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, but lost out under US pressure. Since US President Nixon abandoned the US dollar –gold peg in August 1971, the subsequent “floating” of world currencies and the progressive deregulation of capital markets, current account imbalances have grown exponentially. They have been widely used for political and financial leverage, putting world financial stability at risk.

 

In New Zealand, the banks themselves, which are mostly foreign-owned, borrow a large part of the capital inflow discussed above. It is cheaper for them to pay the offshore borrowing cost than it would be to pay deposit interest on domestic deposits, which is relatively high in New Zealand. As at February 2011, the registered M3 banking institutions had borrowed NZ$ 81b. in foreign currency while the Reserve Bank of New Zealand held NZ$ 17b. in reserve assets leaving net bank borrowing on the current account of NZ$ 65 billion [47]. In total, New Zealand registered banks have borrowed half the nation’s accumulated current account deficit. They hold domestic debt borrowed to fund New Zealand’s current account outflow as an asset on their balance sheet and an equal offshore foreign currency loan, no doubt hedged in New Zealand dollars where possible, as a corresponding liability on their balance sheet. Contrary to popular belief, such bank borrowing does NOT directly cause increases in property prices in New Zealand. This is because the creation of the additional domestic debt used to fund the current account deficit precedes the banks’ offshore borrowing. The bank “borrowing” the foreign exchange simply “stores” some of the deposits being returned by creditor countries that would otherwise result in the direct sale of New Zealand assets to settle New Zealand’s current account imbalance. The foreign exchange borrowing is the end of the foreign exchange settlement process, not the beginning. The new debt in New Zealand has already been used to fund consumption and remittances on the current account and it can only be used once. If the New Zealand banks chose not to hold the foreign currency referred to above, the additional domestic deposits that would necessarily arise from the sale of an equal amount of assets to foreigners would further inflate domestic asset values in New Zealand.

 

The use of the term “saving” to describe a current account surplus is therefore misleading [48]. In Figure 1 the creditor country has surplus deposits. It uses the deposits to buy foreign assets not because it has saved but because it has sold surplus production offshore. It is a trading dynamic, not a conscious decision to forgo or defer consumption. It is often more a function of overproduction than under-consumption. The assets it buys mostly represent existing wealth like equities, businesses, property, and related loans, rather than new investment in bonds and business expansion in the debtor country that would be defined as productive investment in the SNA. It is not “saving” as defined in orthodox economic theory because the purchased assets do not relate to new domestic production in the creditor country and do not alter its gross domestic product.

 

From the debtor country’s point of view, deposits arising from foreign capital inflows on the current account “invested” in funds that are not committed to productive investment or that are held in the form of loans to domestic banks do not qualify as investments in the debtor country national accounts. They do so only when they are committed to new productive capacity in the debtor country. Instead, most inflows that appear as domestic deposits in the debtor country typically qualify as “investment” in the unproductive investment sector that serves to inflate the value of existing assets or “wealth” there. Such “investment” neither adds to nor reduces production capacity. It does not qualify as investment under the SNA and is therefore not “saving” as defined in orthodox economic theory. Moreover, any deposits from the capital inflows used to retire existing debt in the debtor country reduce debt and deposits by the same amount. They do not affect the domestic economy of the debtor country other than to reduce its rate of systemic inflation a little [49].

 

Treating a current account surplus or deficit as wholly positive or negative in the saving equation (13) in the National income and outlay account therefore cannot be correct because the “investment” arises from consumer debt as shown in Figure 1 [50].

 

The SNA National income and outlay account [51] does contain the gross operating surplus and “consumption of fixed capital”, so it does make allowance within the account for investment qualifying as productive investment under the SNA. However this investment is not the residual referred to as “Saving” in the national income and outlay account. In the debt model, new capital goods are produced and then “consumed” in the sense of being purchased as is discussed fully in Section 5 of this paper. All new capital goods are bought from total incomes given on the income side of the national income and outlay account. Repayment of existing debt comes out of the income (the gross operating surplus in the national accounts) generated from existing and new capital investment. The more repayments there are, the less net income there will be left over to pay for new capital goods.  Net expenditure on new productive investment in the national accounts should, from equation (1), therefore be:

 

Saving S = Productive investment = DI-C  = gross fixed capital formation less principal repayments.       (14)

 

[47] Reserve Bank of New Zealand Table C3 (current).

[48] The SNA amplifies this at United Nations, 2008, Ch. 26 “The rest of the world accounts and links to the balance of payments, BOPM6”. It says at p. 683,  “In the SNA, transactions between a resident unit and the current external balance thus show how far residents call on saving by non-residents.”

[49] This is true even if the debt retired forms part of the productive transaction deposits My in the debt model. In that case, other players in the productive economy would have “spare” income leading either to inflation or to additional non-SNA qualifying “savings” as discussed in Section 5.

[50] It could perhaps be labelled “surplus consumption debt plus debt funding for foreign interest and profit”.

[51] Shown as Table 1.2 in the new Zealand national accounts published by Statistics New Zealand.

 

Equation (14) reflects the fundamental orthodox economic premise stated at page 11 of this paper that Saving = (productive) Investment. Productive Saving is a net figure that recognises that some of the incomes nominally available for investment are used to retire existing investment debt. Only the net income left over after debt retirement is still available to buy new capital assets as discussed fully in section 5 of this paper.

 

The SNA national accounts are not presented in the format shown in equation (14).

 

In fact, there is no such thing as the “residual” “saving” figure that is presently shown in the national income and outlay account of the national accounts. Saving S = (Productive) Investment is indirectly built into the income side of the national income and outlay account (as presently presented in the national accounts) as  “gross fixed capital formation” (Investment) less “consumption of fixed capital” (depreciation) but, as discussed in section 5 below, that is neither accurate nor sufficient.

 

In a creditor country the production surplus is sold through its current account but it does not qualify as investment in Equation (14). The purchase of foreign assets by a creditor country is an exchange of spare domestic consumption capacity in the creditor country for other (capital) goods from the debtor country. That is fundamentally no different than if the spare production were consumed domestically. The total income and expenditure remain the same. The only difference is that the capital account balances of the creditor and debtor countries change.

 

The purchase of offshore assets including loans to offshore banks is, from the point of view of the creditor country, income earning and “productive” at the price paid for them, otherwise the exchange would not take place. That “income” is not strictly national income for the creditor country because it cannot be remitted there. It forms part of the creditor country’s current account surplus that is, in turn, swapped for more foreign assets, and so on as long as the current account surplus continues.

 

The key conceptual element is the “swap” that takes place within the domestic economies of the debtor and creditor countries.

 

In a debt based financial system, deposits to pay for surplus consumption and remittances in the debtor country originate outside of that country’s production cycle. The only “income” generated is that resulting from the subsequent sale of capital goods in the debtor economy to its foreign creditors, but that must be treated as a economic loss rather than income from production.

 

Taking the current account balance in creditor countries and debtor countries in turn the sequence of the exchange that takes place is :

 

Any gross fixed capital formation from return capital flows invested by a creditor country as foreign direct investment in new capital goods in the debtor country is automatically included in the GDP of the debtor country [52]. The increase in the total capital value in the creditor country contributed by the capital goods it receives in payment of the debtor country’s CA deficit should be recorded in its capital account as well, if it is to be treated as income, as in its National income and outlay account.

 

In a debtor country, gross fixed capital formation arising from any return capital flows invested by the creditor country in new capital goods in the debtor country is automatically included in the GDP of the debtor country [53].  The decrease in the total capital value of capital goods in the debtor country resulting from its sale of capital goods to the creditor country in payment of the debtor country’s CA deficit should be recorded in its capital account as well as, if it is to be treated as negative income, in its National income and outlay account.

 

These sequences comply with the traditional orthodox economic theory represented by the amended savings equation (15) below. When a country’s current account is in balance or when the current account balance is omitted from the national income and outlay account as proposed above, equation (14) becomes:

 

Saving S (net)(Investment) =  Current account surplus (CA)

                                            +  Gross capital formation (including increase in stocks) [54]

                                             -   Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation)

                                             +  Statistical discrepancy [55]                                                          (15)

 

[52] It is assumed that, since the debt that gives rise to the sale of capital goods in the debtor country already exists, the deposits created from that debt also exist at any point in time. Any productive investment arising from those deposits returned to the debtor country in payment for its capital assets is therefore automatically included in the debtor country’s domestic gross fixed capital formation.

[53] It is assumed that, since the debt that gives rise to the sale of capital goods in the debtor country already exists, the deposits created from that debt also exist at any point in time. Any productive investment arising from those deposits returned to the debtor country in payment for its capital assets is therefore automatically included in the debtor country’s domestic gross fixed capital formation.

[54] Gross capital formation is another term for (gross productive) Investment.  Increase in stocks is also usually treated as investment by convention.

[55] Required because of errors in the GDP production and expenditure estimates even though the operating surplus is itself already a residual.

 

In equation (15) investment is still incorrectly defined as Gross capital formation (including increase in stocks) less Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation).

 

Equation (15) would only represent Savings = Investment according to the orthodox economic theory if consumption of fixed capital (depreciation) were a cash flow and the increase in stocks represented productive investment. It is not and they do not. 

 

Equation (15) as it stands still does not represent orthodox economic theory.

 

The mechanical processes relating to capital flows, the purchase of capital goods, and changes in inventories (stocks) are discussed further in Sections 5 and 6 of this paper.

 

The amended National Disposable Income (DI) for New Zealand 1962-2010 is shown in Figure 7 of this paper. Figure 7 incorporates the following changes to the existing SNA format :

 

(a)  deletion (or reduction) of the change in inventory from the gross product and expenditure account and corresponding correction of the gross operating surplus.

(b)  substituting the corrected gross operating surplus after subtracting the “balance on external goods and services”.

(c)  replacing residual ‘saving” with Saving as in equation (15) but with principal repayments substituted for depreciation.

(d)  deleting the current account surplus, including the “balance on external goods and services”.

 

Contrary to the methods of calculation in use until now, the proposed changes provide rational results for New Zealand that comply with orthodox economic theory.

 

 

05.  CAPITAL FLOWS AND THE PURCHASE OF CAPITAL GOODS.

 

The production of goods and services giving rise to new capital goods is included in the productive transaction deposits as My that when multiplied by their speed of circulation Vy  give rise to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). [56]  Those new capital goods must be sold to clear the market. Since the income earners in the productive sector who want to buy the capital goods are not usually the same as those who produce the capital goods, they are exchanged through bank intermediation. The buyers of the capital goods borrow part of the production incomes of employees (employee incomes) and businesses (gross operating surplus) as shown in the upper part of Figure 2. That enables the original producer loans to be retired, thereby clearing the market as the debt model requires.

 

 

In aggregate, some employees and businesses have swapped their share of the sale price of the capital goods that they do not want to consume with others in the productive sector  (the investors shown at the lower left of Figure 2), who do want to consume them.  This creates lending within the productive sector.

 

Click here to view : FIGURE 2.  DYNAMIC DEBT MODEL FUNDING THE PRODUCTION AND PURCHASE OF NEW CAPITAL GOODS.

 

In Figure 2 the bank loans supporting the production transaction deposits conceptually retired in each production cycle. (See The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts).  My is assumed for simplicity to include the whole value of goods produced during the production cycle.

 

In the hypothetical case when no capital goods are produced, the outside loop on the left and bottom of Figure 2 would not be needed. The transaction deposits My would be used to produce goods and services for consumption, generating incomes. The incomes would be banked and then used to pay for consumption. The producers would then use the sale income to pay off their transaction deposits My. In practice the process is dynamic. There is always an outstanding pool of transaction deposits My  that is continually being recycled through the production system.

 

When capital goods are also produced as shown on the left and lower part of Figure 2, producers (employees and businesses) initially collectively “own” the capital (investment) goods they produce. Conceptually, they hold their share of the capital goods as security for the bank loan  (part of the debt giving rise to My ) used to produce them. The bank loan  (part of the debt giving rise to My) used to produce the capital goods has to be repaid when they are sold just as is the case for consumption goods and services.

 

The producers have an asset equal to the sale value of the capital goods and an equal offsetting liability, their debt (part of the debt giving rise to My) to the bank. The debt model assumes for simplicity that, during the production phase of the production cycle, producers draw down (pay themselves) all of their operating surplus as income [57]. The production transaction deposits My represent the full sale value of all the goods and services, including capital goods, produced during the production phase.

 

[57] For simplicity, in the debt model, all income including all of the gross operating surplus is included in My. Any error in this assumption is small because My  is small compared to GDP.

 

Once the consumption goods and services have been consumed only the capital goods are left. The market sale value of those capital goods that have not yet been “consumed” equals the remaining incomes that have not yet been spent, as shown at the top left of Figure 2. The remaining incomes are the Saving required by orthodox economics as discussed in section 4 of this paper. The capital goods for sale are the corresponding investment. This gives Saving = (productive) Investment as in equation (14). 

 

Producers must sell the capital goods they have produced to repay their bank debt (part of the debt giving rise to My). When they do so, the buyers of the capital goods take out a bank loan as shown on the left of Figure 2. The total of such loans is the Saving shown at the top of Figure 2. The buyer of the capital good (the investor) pays the producer the sale price and the producer then retires the outstanding loan (part of the debt giving rise to My) used to produce the capital good. Conceptually the investors (bottom left of Figure 2) have borrowed just enough from the Saving pool (top of Figure 2) to clear the outstanding production debt (part of the debt giving rise to My) used to produce the capital goods. That is exactly as defined in the Baumol and Blinder quote on page 11 of this paper. The only way for the market to clear without inflation or deflation is where the purchase price of the capital goods to be “saved” by one part of the productive sector equals the sum on-loaned to investors who usually form another part of the productive sector, exactly as orthodox theory requires.

 

Capital formation therefore conceptually takes place by new debt formation within the productive sector itself.  It is the re-allocation of existing incomes in the productive sector.

 

This is in full agreement with orthodox economic theory.

 

In aggregate, “Saving” in the orthodox sense of Saving = (Productive) Investment as illustrated in Figure 2 occurs only to the extent some employees and businesses lend some of their market incomes to other players in the same market who wish to buy the capital goods that are available. If some of those market incomes (employee incomes and gross operating surplus as shown at the top right of Figure 2) are withdrawn from circulation in the form of non-productive “saving” for non-productive “investment” as currently claimed in the SNA National Income and Outlay accounts, or for debt retirement, either an equivalent amount of NEW bank debt MUST be introduced to make up the difference or economic activity will be suppressed. There would not be enough income left to buy all the goods and services, including capital goods, which have been produced. [See Figure 3 investment I1 below and section 4 of this paper]. The only exception to this would be where an equal existing non-productive “investment” deposits were returned to the productive economy to be used for consumption. This happens, for example, when pensions are paid out of pension funds.

 

In practice, as shown in the more recent paper The DNA of the debt-based economy all of the net capital investment is initially represented by bank debt and the accumulated outstanding principal on that debt equals the GDP. That is because the residual existing incomes in the productive sector referred to above are withdrawn from circulation to satisfy the requirements of the debt model  (Ms + Dca + Db).  They are a structural part of the debt system and are not related to voluntary “saving”. That is why trying to increase non-productive “saving” destroys economic activity unless that ”saving” is  invested in new productive capacity.

 

Figure 3 traces the broad savings impact in a debt-based economy. It assumes the residual “saving” presently shown in the income and outlay account of the national accounts prepared under the SNA (called here Type 1 saving) is a myth.

 

Let Type 2 saving (the funding available from income and operating surplus shown at the top of Figure 3) be T2.

 

Let Type 3 “saving” (the funding available from the current account surplus as presently shown in the income and outlay account of the national accounts prepared under the SNA) be T3. It is shown at the centre of Figure 3.

 

Let new debt funding from domestic banks be Bd. This is shown at the bottom of Figure 3.

 

Further let the funding T2, T3 and Bd be distributed according to the following six uses:

 

I1  = productive investment

I2  = change in inventories

I3  = loans and bonds to business

I4  = loans and bonds to government

I5  = purchase of existing assets

I6  = loans and bonds to commercial banks

 

Let a, b, c, d, e, f  be the proportion of Type 2 funding applied to each use, g, h, i, j, k, l be the proportion of Type 3 funding applied to each use and let m, n, o, p, q be the proportion of new bank debt applied to each use.

 

The resulting schema shown in Figure 3 applies to creditor countries and shows the sources and distribution of funding. Its application to debtor countries is discussed above. Links considered to be minor are shown dotted. Consumption is omitted.

 

Click here to view FIGURE 3. SCHEMATIC CAPITAL FLOWS: SOURCES AND USES OF “SAVING” AND “INVESTMENT.”[58]: CREDITOR COUNTRIES.

 

[58] Figure 3 is drawn from the point of view of a creditor country.

 

There are many known quantities in the matrix shown in Figure 3 and it should be possible to calculate each of the proportions a, ………q. At this point the intent of Figure 3 is to show how the current system of national accounts (SNA) and orthodox economics fail to reflect the real dynamic economy. A more detailed analysis would require a separate paper.

 

There are several obvious relationships.  For example:

 

a*T2 + g*T3+ m*Bd  =  Productive investment I1, whether Gross fixed capital formation or net fixed capital formation. (Net fixed capital formation = Gross fixed capital formation – Principal repayments on existing capital goods). 

 

For the market to clear just current production of all goods and services, (g*T3 + m*Bd) must represent net household, business and government non-productive “savings” including, in New Zealand, Kiwisaver, the various superannuation funds like the Cullen Superannuation Fund, and sinking funds like Accident Compensation Corporation and the Government Earthquake Fund. Otherwise, as described above,  productive Saving could not equal Investment as shown in Figure 2.

 

That in turn suggests:

 

g*T3+m*Bd  = b*T2+c*T2+d*T2+e*T2+f*T2. 

 

If that were not so, the productive sector would either inflate or deflate because demand does not match the goods and services available for consumption. The total of b*T2+c*T2+d*T2+e*T2+f*T2 represents a withdrawal of purchasing power from incomes leaving too little income to buy the available goods and services that have been produced. The withdrawal must be replaced with new purchasing power if the market is to clear. The only replacement funding to T2 (neglecting j* T3 and p* Bd) is g*T3 and m* Bd. That is what gives rise to the equality proposed above.

 

The ratio f, the proportion of T2 “savings” from incomes and operating surpluses “invested” in the form of loans and bonds to commercial banks, is usually small. Net household, business and government “savings” from incomes and operating surpluses pass largely into non-productive investments. In the case of c*T2 they inflate the value of existing assets and in the case of e*T2 they support government budget deficits.

 

Figure 3 is drawn from the point of view of a creditor country with a current account surplus. It shows how the outward capital flow through the current account surplus T3 is spent, that is, what the creditor country buys with the surplus. For some countries, l*T3 (funds from the T3 current account surplus loaned to commercial banks in the form of financial instruments such as bonds) has become an important part of the T3 capital flow to debtor countries. It is part of the so-called “carry” trade. It can be cheaper for banks to borrow foreign money and hold foreign exchange liabilities than it is for them to pay deposit interest on domestic deposits arising from the sale of domestic assets to offset foreign exchange obligations, especially if the liabilities are hedged in the local currency.

 

The widely held belief that bank funds borrowed offshore give rise to escalating property prices is false. This is because the domestic debt that causes the borrowing has already been created to fund the current account deficit. On the other hand, as described in Section 4 of this paper, the sale of domestic assets to settle the debtor country’s foreign exchange obligations does result in debtor country deposits that do tend to inflate existing asset “values” there as well as increase the debt model systemic inflation. 

 

The creation of domestic debt in the debtor country precedes the return capital flow from the creditor country. The sale by NZ registered banks of bonds to foreigners is just another form of foreign investment by the creditor country. The root cause of asset price inflation rests in the mechanics of the debt system itself, as set out in the debt model for which links are provided at the start of Section 2. A large accumulated foreign ownership of a domestic economy makes the asset inflation much worse to the extent it increases the domestic debt level and the inflationary domestic deposit base in the debtor country. This is especially so where the domestic investment potential has already been depleted by prior asset sales to foreigners.

 

The situation in debtor countries is slightly more complicated than shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows what creditor countries buy with their inward capital flow. The capital comes in, and domestic assets of the debtor country are sold, though often indirectly as in the case of investment categories I3, I4 and I6, including bank commercial paper.

 

Domestic assets in debtor countries, on the other hand, do not just pass into foreign ownership. There is a further issue over what the domestic seller in the debtor country does with the deposit resulting from the sale of domestic assets. For example, if the loans and bonds to business (I3) are used to finance mergers there is no new productive investment from the process. If deposits from the purchase of existing assets (I5) by foreigners are used for consumption or for bidding up the price of other existing assets (for example if the previous owner retires) they will lead to asset price inflation. The opposite would be the case if they were used to retire existing domestic debt. While Figure 3 assumes for simplicity that none of the T3 capital flows is used for consumption it is theoretically possible some consumption does occur.

 

Fundamentally, there is no such thing as foreign debt.  There is only foreign ownership of a debtor country’s productive resources and other assets. Current account surpluses must be generated if the foreign ownership is to be reduced.

 

The new productive investments shown in Figure 2 produce income. They form part of the (presumably) growing productive sector. The debt used to purchase them is progressively repaid from the income received.

 

Any part of aggregate domestic production incomes held by foreigners that is repatriated abroad is part of the current account of both the debtor and creditor countries. In New Zealand, it is largely made up of remittances of interest and profit. Those remittances are funded in the first instance by deposits in the debtor country, in this case New Zealand, arising from the “surplus consumption debt plus funding for foreign interest and profit” shown on the left half of Figure 1. Extra debt and deposits are created to fund the remittances because the current account deficit in a debt-based financial system is, by definition, borrowed – otherwise there wouldn’t be a deficit in the first place. As already discussed in Section 4, the extra debt and subsequent deposits created through the sale of assets exist as part of the national dynamic economic flows in the debtor country. They are automatically brought into its domestic economy.

 

Current account transactions are EXCHANGE transactions, not production transactions. In the debtor country GDP incomes exclude extra payments needed to pay for surplus imports. The “balance on external goods and services” is part of the additional debt it must borrow to settle its current account. The additional debt figure is negative when the balance on external goods and services is positive and positive when the balance is negative. A positive trade balance simply reduces the current account deficit of a debtor country. A similar thing happens in the creditor country. There the incomes that still exist when the surplus goods are exported are offset (sterilised) by the subsequent purchase of offshore assets. 

 

There is no “saving” residual on the “use of income” side of the National income and outlay account because the items Current account balance (CA) and the “Purchase abroad of non-productive capital investment goods” there cancel each other out. There is, instead, (subject always to the following sections 6 and 7 of this paper and Figure 4 below) a known quantum of saving as in equation (15).

 

Saving S (net)  =   +  Gross capital formation (including increase in stocks) [59].

                                 -   Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation).

                                 +  Statistical discrepancy [60].                                                                                    (15)

 

[59] Gross capital formation is the same as Investment. The increase in stocks is also usually treated as investment by convention.

[60] Required because of errors in the GDP production and expenditure estimates even though the operating surplus is itself already a residual.

 

That brings the national income and outlay account into agreement with conventional economic theory as discussed in Section 4 as long as depreciation is replaced with “principal repayments” and as long as the gross operating surplus is what is left after the balance on the external account has been subtracted.

 

Leaving aside the Current Account balance as in Section 4 of this paper and substituting directly from SNA Table 1.1 of the National Accounts, the “income” side of the National income an outlay account then becomes:

 

National disposable income (DI)  =  Compensation of employees

                                           + Gross operating surplus

                                                         + Taxes on production and imports (less subsidies)

                                                         Change in inventories

                   Gross fixed capital formation

                   + Gross fixed capital formation (including increase in stocks)

                    - Consumption of fixed capital                                                               (16)

 

Even more simply, substituting the terms for GDP from equation 2 in Appendix 1, the “income” side of the National income and outlay account is:

 

National disposable income  (DI) = Gross Domestic Product

                                                    - Balance on external goods and services

                                                         - Consumption of fixed capital                                                                 (17)

 

Equation 17 is logical as long as “consumption of fixed capital” is replaced with “principal repayments”, as discussed in Section 7 of this paper. The total amount available to spend is what is earned less debt cancellation through debt retirement and what by necessity has been spent or sent abroad. A positive balance on external goods and services is not “disposable” because it is unavailable to the domestic economy. On the other hand, a negative balance is “disposable” because it is available to the domestic economy even though the “income” to buy it is borrowed rather than earned. That means National disposable income is quite a different concept from GDP, and, on the face of it, is misnamed. The “statistical discrepancy” in equation (15) might not be required because there would be only one residual number in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 of the National Accounts, namely the “gross operating surplus” whereas there were previously two: the “gross operating surplus” and “saving”.

 

And, where the current account surplus is treated as income in the National accounts, it must included in both sides of DI:

 

Use of income side: =  Final consumption C

   +  Purchase abroad of non-productive capital investment goods (=CA)

   +  Saving for productive investment S                                                                              (18)           

 

Income side:            =  GDP

   +  Current account balance (CA)

   less the balance on external goods and services

   less repayments of principal on outstanding productive investment                              (19)

 

Figure 4 shows a first approximation of principal repayments as a proportion of gross fixed capital formation in New Zealand from 1962-2010. The trend line (a second order polynomial) shows clearly that the ratio has increased over time. That means (from equation (14)) that, in New Zealand, SNA savings as a proportion of GDP have been declining. The same will be true for other developed countries too, (Kerin, 2009).

 

Saving in developed countries, particularly debtor countries like New Zealand, has fallen dramatically because business has sought to include higher depreciation rates on productive investments. The banks’ response is to require higher repayment rates on investments with higher depreciation rates. As both interest and depreciation form part of their income-expenditure account, firms will be “better off” provided the extra depreciation exceeds the reduction in interest on the outstanding debt [61]. While higher depreciation may in part reflect technological evolution and “planned obsolescence”, its main effect has been to increase the ratio of principal repayments to productive investment as shown in Figure 4. Higher repayment rates lead to a lower net operating surplus after debt servicing and therefore a lower saving rate[62]. This process has taken place despite an offsetting trend of greater population mobility. Greater population mobility means that, in aggregate, residential property is refinanced more often. That reduces the average principal repayments made on table mortgages because, with a table mortgage, the capital repayment is smallest at the start of the mortgage and increases over the term of the mortgage.

 

National saving has been swapped this way for short-term profit, typically boosting stock and existing property prices instead of longer-term investment.

 

Until now, there has been little or no mention in economics literature of this structural impact on saving. The use of depreciation in the National accounts under the SNA is incorrect because it represents neither the true cash flow nor does it conform to appropriate accounting practice for the nations of the world.

 

Repayments of household debt, as distinct from business debt, tend to be directly related to household debt levels because depreciation of residential household property in countries like New Zealand is not tax deductible. Household incomes are steadily eroded through the payment of interest on deposits held in other sectors of the financial system. That interest is unearned income that adds nothing to the productive economy. Unearned income in the form of interest on deposits is a structural feature of the debt-based financial system itself that produces exponential debt growth as the productive economy is forced to inflate to cover the unearned interest payments to deposit holders [63]. More debt servicing means incomes for consumption are reduced unless earned incomes increase at least as fast as the unearned interest payments. They have not done so for decades[64].

 

[61] For example, if the depreciation rate on a purchase of $10.000 is increased from 20% to 25% (therefore repaid in about 3 years) the extra depreciation is $500/year, whereas the interest saved (at 10%) is just 10% of, say, a $650 extra annual repayment, or $65 per year for 3 years; about $200 altogether. The firm’s profit increases by roughly $300/year.

[62] United Nations, 2008  par. A.3.88 p.589 states: “The 2008 SNA recommends that the consumption of fixed capital should be measured at the average prices of the  period with respect to a constant-quality price index of the asset concerned”. This appears to exaggerate the “depreciation” effect on saving.

[63] Manning Lowell  The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts Version 5 14/8/11 Sections 3 and 4.

[64] Refer to the link How to create stable financial systems in four complementary steps.

 

The potential for households to repay capital is strongly influenced by interest rates.

 

Mortgage terms typically tend to be in the 25 to 30 year range to guarantee repayment, because the nominal lifetime of domestic dwellings rarely exceeds 50 years. The standard New Zealand Inland Revenue Department “diminishing value” depreciation rate on most buildings is 3%. Since most buildings are on-sold in about 7 years on average, most people will prefer to use the diminishing value rate of 3% rather than the “lineal” depreciation rate of 2%. Each time the property is sold the purchase price becomes the new baseline for depreciation. The result is that most property is depreciated as if it had a lifetime of 33 years rather than 50 years. The figure 33/25 (25 year loan) indicates a repayment rate of 32% above the depreciation figure while 33/30 (30 year loan) indicates a repayment rate of 10% above the depreciation figure. The average would be around 21% if home loans were equally distributed between 25 and 30 years. They are not, and some loans are for a shorter period, but the figures broadly support the preliminary empirical “average” figure of 23% used in this paper.

 

Most property transactions involve existing (second-hand) properties. Rising interest rates reduce household debt servicing capacity while lower interest rates increase it. Higher interest rates increase the drain of unearned income from household incomes. In the longer term, household saving is practicable only in a financial system based on interest-free money. Interest free money prevents income being stripped from households through the payment of unearned deposit income as interest on exponentially increasing debt.

 

Click here to see : FIGURE 4.      PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS AS A PROPORTION OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN NEW ZEALAND 1962-2010. [65]

 

[65] Figure 4 is provisional because it is based on an estimated repayment rate 23% higher than the consumption of fixed capital. The figure of 23% is believed to be accurate on average over the period, but varies from year to year according to the business cycle. In New Zealand, the average occupancy of a residential dwelling is traditionally about 7 years, so most mortgages are NOT paid off, but regularly refinanced. A 25 year mortgage of NZ$ 1 million at 5.75% (NZ September, 2011) requires monthly payments of NZ$ 6.300 approximately, of which (at the start of the loan, NZ$ 4.800 is interest. The principal repayments at the start of such a loan are NZ$ 1.500/6.300 or  23.8%.  

 

Interest-free money would avoid systemic inflation in the productive economy and enable real income growth from higher productivity to be better reflected in household incomes.

 

The proportion of capital repayments to gross capital formation tends to rise when times are bad because new capital formation declines. Loan defaults lead to faster debt retirement as firms and households struggle to meet mortgage repayments when interest rates are high and banks must write off losses. It is also likely that population mobility decline because of rising unemployment and fewer job opportunities.  On the other hand, the proportion of capital repayments reduces during expansions because debt expansion and capital formation increase as the banks relax their lending criteria.

 

The principal repayments in Figure 4 are based on 123% of the depreciation shown in the official SNA national accounts. Using principal repayments equal to 123% the SNA depreciation gives very good results for New Zealand for most of the period 1962-2006. There is nothing magical about 123%. The actual repayment rate will vary from country to country and from year to year. That is why, for the time being, best-fit alternatives have been used for the periods 1990-1993 and 2000-2006. The information relating to debt repayment should be readily available or can be made available. Banks regularly provide their clients with certificates for each loan for tax purposes specifying the amount of principal and interest paid on the loan. Accurate figures mean collating the existing available data across the banking system.

 

For comparison with existing New Zealand National account data, Figure 5 shows New Zealand SNA saving in billions of New Zealand dollars calculated as proposed in equation (14) and that same saving as a percentage of New Zealand GDP. Saving is plotted as gross fixed capital formation according to current SNA practice less 1.23 times the SNA consumption of fixed capital and with the data series “corrected” for 1990-1993 and 2000-2006 as mentioned above. This means that assumed actual capital repayments have been applied in Figure 5 instead of the depreciation figures presently used in the SNA.

 

Figure 5 reveals a shocking structural decline in Saving in New Zealand over the years. It has fallen systemically, based on the trend line, from 12% of GDP in 1962 to about 4% in 2010. In the absence of financial reform, there is little to suggest that saving will not decline further over time, thereby guaranteeing economic stagnation. Data for 2010 for New Zealand suggest saving for (productive) investment was just 1% of GDP.

 

The decline in national saving is structural and cannot be addressed anywhere in the world using existing orthodox economic theory and policy.

 

Capital transfers and “investment” flows unrelated to the current account are also part of the existing National capital account of the SNA. They are, in the first instance, transfers of deposits, not capital goods. Capital flows reduce the domestic deposits and foreign exchange reserves of the donor country and create a corresponding increase in the deposits and reserves of the country that receives them.  Whether or not those capital transfers are productive or inflationary in the recipient country depends upon how they are used there. In either case, the foreign exchange mechanism still has to be satisfied just as for the current account. In aggregate, the donor country must sell capital assets or surplus production to the recipient country to balance its foreign exchange account. The recipient country must “spend” the transfer money to reverse the inward capital transfer and balance its foreign exchange account [66]. 

 

[66] For much of the period in New Zealand 1962-2010, capital transfers were considered to be part of the current account because they could not be distinguished from current transfers. United Nations, 2008,  at par. 8.38-8.40, p.162 attempts to define the distinction.

 

Click here to see : FIGURE 5. NATIONAL SAVING S, AND NATIONAL SAVINGS S AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP NEW ZEALAND 1962-1010.

 

Capital transfers result in the outflow of capital goods from the donor country and inflow of capital goods to the receiving country and this exchange should be recorded in the National capital account. . Whether the deposit from the initial capital transfer is productive, non-productive or inflationary depends upon how it is used in the receiving country.

 

 

6. CHANGES IN INVENTORIES (STOCKS).

 

This paper proposes that increases in stocks are not investments as stated by convention in the SNA. Stocks may even have zero economic value. Increases in stocks are treated as investment in the SNA at present because they are viewed as goods and services left over (“saved”) for later sale. They have been produced but not consumed and their cost of production is already included in the SNA on the income side of the national accounts.

 

If the residual incomes from the production of the spare inventory were still in circulation, leftover goods and services would be consumed. Since residual incomes are not available for the purchase of the spare inventory they must already have been “spent” on other consumption or on debt reduction or on non-SNA compliant “saving”, which is discussed in detail in section 7. Increases in inventory, other than what is needed to offset population growth and inflation, represent a market mismatch. In practical terms, final prices have been too high to clear the market. There are three possible causes for this. The first possible cause is that business has failed to discount prices enough in the (forlorn) hope that future incomes will grow faster than production. In that case current prices could be maintained. The second possible cause is where the incomes to pay for the spare inventory have been drawn out of circulation through non-SNA compliant “savings” programs. The third possible cause is debt reduction, especially consumer debt, particularly expensive credit card debt.

 

“Savings” in funds that fail to qualify as investment in the national accounts and in orthodox economic theory, such as, in New Zealand, the government National Provident Fund, the government “Cullen” Superannuation fund, the Kiwisaver scheme, and private superannuation schemes, have to come from somewhere. They are not investments according to equation (14). Some of the non-SNA compliant “savings” could come from the “surplus deposits” shown at the top left of Figure 1 that arise from the current account process discussed in Section 4. Most of them, however, arise as withdrawals from earned income in the productive sector. This is because the “savings” programmes are deliberately structured to work that way in the mistaken belief they will somehow increase economic performance. They don’t.

 

Withdrawals of income from the productive sector lead quickly to economic recession as discussed at length in The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts. They mean there is less money available from incomes for consumption, leading to supply exceeding demand, price discounting as businesses seek to avoid increases in their inventories and job losses as businesses retrench. Powerful advertising campaigns seek to induce consumers to take on new consumer debt to maintain or increase consumption. Once discounting reaches the point at which their profit is exhausted, firms begin to fail. Despite those consequences, inventories have been growing in New Zealand in recent years, except for the year ended March 2010 [67]. Job losses in 2010 appear to have caused inventories to shrink by NZ$ 1.3 billion. Enticing people to “save” incomes in a debt-based economy will destroy the economy and tend to increase business inventory. 

 

Inventory (other than “stable” inventory needed to maintain reasonable continuity of supply to consumers) has little residual value other than increases needed to offset population growth and inflation. Excess inventory must either be discounted at a cost to future sales or future production reduced as set out in The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts unless consumers can be persuaded to take on additional consumer debt [68]. Because excess inventory has little or no economic value it should be deleted from or discounted in the national accounts despite its having been produced. [69]  Otherwise it does not satisfy the “mark to market” rules set out in the SNA protocol. Much of the change in inventories is presently “double counted” in the GDP. This is because the corresponding incomes to buy the change in inventories have either been siphoned off into non-productive “saving” or used to subsidise the prices of the goods and services that have already been consumed.

 

[67] New Zealand national accounts published by Statistics New Zealand.

[68] If they were there would be no increase in inventory in the first place.

[69] Though it should probably be noted as a memo item.

 

 

7. “SAVINGS” THAT DO NOT QUALIFY AS SAVING UNDER THE  SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OR ORTHODOX ECONOMICS.

 

People do not borrow to “save”. Yet one of the less fortunate features of developed economies is that people are encouraged to consume more than they earn. Consumers have even been encouraged to increase their consumption by refinancing existing property assets, such as recently happened widely in the United States. This contributed to the sub-prime housing crisis there. In countries like New Zealand, extra borrowing for consumption has been on a more modest scale, but the outcome has been the same. This paper argues that claimed “savings” are, in aggregate, deposits arising from new unproductive debt [70] or they reflect reduced purchasing power in the productive economy or they reflect domestic re-investment of deposits arising from the sale of capital assets as discussed in Section 4 of this paper.

 

Just as productive investment has been shown to be a transfer of purchasing power within the productive sector, the “savings” arising from new debt are typically transfers of purchasing power among consumers. In a debt-based financial system, for every participant who “saves” productive income, another somewhere else must be going into debt to support that saving unless non-productive investment sector deposits are transferred to the productive sector to pay for consumption there. 

 

The process is typically voluntary:  some people choose to consume more than they earn by using consumer finance or by refinancing their assets, while others choose to consume less than they earn. The market will not clear if the two sides do not balance and, for example, there is more “saving” than consumer debt generated. This would lead to increases in inventories, suppression of prices and the market failure typical of recessions. This will and must happen whenever increases in domestic interest rates decrease the willingness of consumers to take on more debt.

 

When “saving” is made compulsory, the productive economy will contract in comparison with voluntary saving, prolonging or even causing recession [71]. That will happen because compulsory saving will usually withdraw more deposits from the productive economy than voluntary “saving” does. The “investments’ made using the “saving” typically form part of the non-productive investment sector as is shown in the paper The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts. The debt supporting them approximately equals (M3-repos) – (M1-M10).

 

While “savings” form part of the non-productive investment sector, any income arising from them is included in productive sector activity as long as it is distributed and used for productive investment or consumption. If, on the other hand, the income from the “savings” investment is capitalised, as is commonly the case, the “savings” increase accordingly, adding further to the total debt the productive sector must support. 

 

[70] Some of those “savings” may come from reinvestment of deposits arising from the sale of assets to settle current account balances as discussed in sections 4 and 5.

[71] Some countries like Australia and The Netherlands have compulsory saving and are still doing well economically, but that might be because much of the saving is going into real or future anticipated productive investment.

 

Net deposit interest becomes part of Ms in the debt model while net interest from bonds and commercial paper is included in productive economy prices for modelling purposes as long as it forms part of the deposits of the New Zealand banking system.

 

At the most fundamental level, increases in the “value” of “savings” investments through revaluations and capital gains represent increases in measured wealth, not “savings”. They can be recorded in a “national wealth account” but not in the national financial accounts.

 

Figure 6 shows how Kiwisaver in New Zealand destroys economic growth.

 

Click here to view : FIGURE 6 : GROWTH DESTRUCTION, KIWISAVER  NEW ZEALAND. [73] [74]

 

In the existing debt system the “savings” of the debt model inflate the value of existing assets at the expense of the productive economy. In New Zealand, the enabling legislation for the savings’ schemes restricts investment risk mainly to specified non-productive portfolio areas as shown in Figure 6. While existing homeowners may benefit from an increase in their property values, non-productive “savings” tend to increase the wealth of the already rich and add to the risk of bubble formation in the unproductive “investment” sector.

 

To be economically effective, existing non-productive “saving” must be redirected into productive domestic business investment, infrastructure, primary health and education. Otherwise it further increases the mal-distribution of income and wealth in the community as a whole.

 

Pension funds like the New Zealand Superannuation fund and New Zealand Kiwisaver are common around the world. They are dangerous to the world economy, especially where they are funded from compulsory contributions out of incomes. The world’s largest 200 pension funds have about US $6 trillion under management while the world’s aggregate pension fund assets are believed to total about US$ 20 trillion [72]. The largest one is the Japanese Government Investment Pension Fund that has almost US$ 1.4 trillion dollars. Three of the twelve largest funds are Canadian (totalling US$ 490 billion) and two of them are Dutch (totalling US$ 436 billion between them, half the Dutch GDP). Collectively the twelve largest funds manage about US$ 3.5 trillion in “savings” or 17.5% of the world’s total.

 

Withdrawals from pension funds are intended to pay all or part of matured retirement pensions on an on-going basis. Since many pensions are subject to income tax on payment of the pensions the draw down of pensions provides an important source of tax revenue for some governments. The “value” of the funds at any time reflects asset inflation in the unproductive investment sector since just a relatively small part of the funds is invested in new productive activity. While new contributions to the funds continually replenish withdrawals, the funds mainly rely on growth in the speculative “paper economy” to fulfil their future obligations.

 

Despite strong regulatory oversight in many countries, pension funds are subject to a high degree of moral hazard. Private sector firms manage many of them and make the investment decisions. Not only do those firms draw fees, some have misappropriated the funds themselves. This happened recently with some of the so-called 401k retirement plans [75] in the United States, leaving large numbers of retirees without retirement income. Moreover, if a major recession occurs, the “value” of the funds plummets because the “value” of the investments plummets. The funds are then dependent on an economic “recovery” to re-establish their fund values. That is one reason economic recovery efforts in the United States after the sub-prime crisis there have focused on the investment sector rather than the productive economy. Large imbalances between fund contributions and fund withdrawals will produce inflation or deflation depending on whether too much is being put in or too much is being withdrawn. The main moral hazard, however, is that the funds are dependent on exponential expansion of debt in the debt system. They are, in effect, giant Ponzi schemes [76].

 

In the debt model, flows into and out of the non-productive investment sector need to be carefully monitored. As discussed above, contributions into “savings” funds represent either new consumer debt or reduced purchasing power in the economy or re-investment of deposits arising from the sale of capital goods to foreigners as part of the foreign exchange mechanism.

 

Withdrawals from "savings" funds must be subtracted from the investment sector balance(s) whether or not they can be identified as original contributions to the funds [77]. Withdrawals represent cash flows out of the investment sector into the productive economy. They will be inflationary for the productive economy unless they are used for new production, as, for example, when new jobs are found for the unemployed, they are used to retire existing debt or they are transferred offshore as current or capital transfers. The withdrawals are funded mainly from the sale of  “investment” assets like shares, property and bonds. The sale of those assets reduces the total funds in the non-productive investment sector and would tend to cause investment prices there to fall.

 

[72] Sources ex Wikipedia ^Global Investment Review ^ The Economist Jan 17, 2008 economist.com.

[73] See for example NZ Ministry of Economic Development http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MulitpageDocumentPage----45007.aspx which gives Kiwisaver Market Dynamics, as updated 21/10/2010. About half the total Kiwisaver funds are “invested” offshore.

[74] The total investment in the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (Cullen Fund) 31/3/11 = NZ$ 14,4 billion.

[75] 401k refers to the section of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of the United States Code) that provides for establishing individual retirement plans. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/401(k).

[76] Chapter 17: Part 2 “Social Insurance Schemes” of SNA 2008, United Nations 2008, provides a great deal of detail relating to the treatment of savings and pension schemes, but it does not adequately deal with the issues raised in this paper.

[77] It appears to be theoretically possible for some debt model investment balances to be negative. For example, in New Zealand at the end March 2011, the NZ government Earthquake Commission (EQC) Fund had assets of over NZ$ 5 billion, but net contributions of only about NZ$ 1.5 billion. The assets have resulted largely from revaluation of the Fund’s investment portfolios over time. The Christchurch earthquakes of September 2010 and February 2011 have created a call on EQC funds that far exceed NZ$ 1.5 billion. As the Fund’s assets are sold and distributed, the debt model investment balances are reduced by the whole payout, not just the total of the contributions originally made to the Fund. These outflows would be offset by capital inflows such as those from offshore re-insurance. It is notionally possible that a similar effect could occur in the case of other Funds and deposits, insurance and re-insurance reserves for example, that make up other investment sector balances, or pension funds where the rate of withdrawals greatly exceeds the level of new contributions.

 

 

8. RE-EVALUATING AND CORRECTING NET SAVINGS AND RELATED ENTRIES IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

 

The change in inventories with little economic value, as set out in Section 6 of this paper, can either be omitted altogether from the gross domestic product and expenditure account or be reduced to a more appropriate level. This is done by reducing the gross operating surplus on the income side and setting the change in inventory on the expenditure side to a figure closer to zero. The effect is to reduce the GDP when the change in inventory is positive and increase it when the change in inventory is negative. The change in inventory should perhaps be noted below the national accounts table. The “gross operating surplus” is part of the GDP. It includes the “balance on external goods and services” that MUST be used to buy foreign capital goods and is unavailable to improve the domestic economy. That reduces the validity of GDP growth as a measure of domestic economic success.

 

In some cases there can be a substantial change in the year on year GDP growth figures provided in the current SNA-based National Accounts. For example in New Zealand in the year ending March 2009 the “balance on external goods and services” was NZ$ -2.4 billion while in the year ending March 2010 it was NZ$ + 2.7 billion. The difference in the recorded domestic growth figure was therefore NZ$ 5.1 billion so that GDP growth recorded by the SNA for the year ended March 2010 overstated domestic growth by NZ$ 5.1b/GDP NZ$ 184.8b or more than 2.7%, despite a population growth of about 1.1%. That is why the New Zealand growth figures for March 2010 appeared to be so high when there was little indication of real growth either on the ground or as shown by the debt mode [78]. Economists do not realise that a balance of trade surplus must be manifest in (a) offshore investment, (b) a reduction in the amount of new domestic credit (reduction in the current account deficit Dca) and (c) a reduction in domestic deposits M3. Nor does the system of National Accounts take this into account when calculating GDP growth.

 

[78] There have also been spectacular over and undercounts in New Zealand in the past:  examples are in the March 1991 year when GDP growth may have been over-counted by 2.5% and in 2006 when it may have been undercounted by 1.7%. In general, New Zealand’s trade performance has been volatile making the growth figures reported in New Zealand unreliable.

 

Five changes are needed to the national income and outlay account of the national accounts and seven changes are proposed to the capital account in the national accounts.

 

The five changes needed to the national income and outlay account of the national accounts are:  

 

(a) On the “use of income” side, the existing saving residual should be replaced by the true saving figure  (gross capital formation less repayments of principal) as required by orthodox economic theory to satisfy equation (1) Saving S= DI-C where saving S= productive investment I, and

 

(b)The gross operating surplus should be the revised figure from the gross domestic product and expenditure account applying the proposed adjustment for changes in inventory,  and

 

(c) The current account entries should appear on both sides of the national income and outlay account as well as being retained in the capital account for the reasons set out in Section 4 of this paper, and

 

(d) The existing figures for “consumption of fixed capital” (depreciation) should be replaced by the actual dynamic cash flow “repayments of investment principal”.

 

(e) When recording National Income and Outlay and Disposable Income for domestic purposes the trade balance should be deducted from the Gross Operating Surplus.

 

Figure 7 compares the National Disposable Income (DI) for New Zealand from 1962 to 2010 revised as proposed above with that shown in the existing national accounts.

 

The proposed revisions to the National income and outlay account closely reflect the National Disposable Income figures given in the existing national accounts until 2004. The preliminary data reveal a large overestimation of disposable income in 2005-2010 [79] despite the negative growth indication from the balance on the external account. This may be due to the plunging Savings trend revealed in this paper.

 

Figure 8 suggests that domestic growth from 1975 to 1988 and from 2006 to 2009 would be higher than was officially recorded by the SNA and that from 1989 to 2005 except for 2001 it would be lower than was officially recorded. The model calibration is not yet sufficiently refined to show this with any certainty. From 2006 to 2010 the model data hint that the official SNA national account data have very poorly reflected New Zealand’s true economic performance.

 

[79] The many statistical limitations of the SNA are discussed at United Nations, 2008, p.396 par 18.11-18.20.

 

 The seven changes that need to be made to the capital account of the national accounts are:

 

(a) On the accumulation side the change in inventories should be set at the lower figure from the gross domestic product and expenditure account to better reflect their real economic contribution to GDP, and

 

(b) “Non SNA qualifying investment ” needs to be added and

 

(c) On the finance of capital accumulation side a new entry “New consumer debt and loss of consumption capacity to fund change in inventories” needs to be added, and

 

(d) The existing item Saving should be replaced by the new item for Saving as outlined in this paper, and

 

(e) “Consumption of fixed capital” should be replaced by “Principal repayments on accumulated outstanding investment”, and

 

(f) A new entry “Reduction in domestic deposits to fund capital goods purchased on the current account” should  be used to account for the current account balance, and

 

(g) A new entry “New consumer debt and loss of consumption capacity to fund  Non SNA qualifying investment” should be used for the finance of  “Non SNA qualifying investment” referred to in (b) above.

Click here to see : FIGURE 7 : COMPARISON OF NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME (DI) CALCULATED USING THE DEBT MODEL TO SATISFY ORTHODOX ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES WITH NATIONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME (DI) SHOWN IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS.

 

Click here to view : FIGURE 8 :  CUMULATIVE BALANCE ON EXTERNAL GOODS AND SERVICES NEW ZEALAND 1962-2010.

 

 

9.  CONCLUSION.

 

The main conclusion from this paper is that the nature of saving in a debt-based economy is very poorly understood. That lack of understanding has produced academic literature and policy frameworks, including the international System of National Accounts (SNA) itself, that have been catastrophic for modern economies.

 

At the most basic level, the international system of national accounts (SNA) presently used to measure all the world’s economic success is shown to be incorrect in at least five ways, which are set out in the following comments (a) to (e).

 

(a) The “saving” recorded as a residual in the National income and outlay account, for example, is a myth. This explains the title of this paper. Orthodox economic theory requires saving to equal investment where investment relates to new productive investment, not “investment” including existing assets.   

 

New productive investment is the gross fixed capital formation recorded in the national accounts. That investment is notionally funded from productive sector incomes. The net investment is the gross fixed capital formation less the principal repayments that are made on existing capital goods.  So the net productive Saving according to economic theory must be that new capital formation less the repayments made out of the gross operating surplus. That is the Saving figure that must appear in the National income and outlay account. Once that is done, one of the most basic equations in orthodox economics is satisfied:

 

S  =  DI – C , being [Productive Saving S = Disposable Income DI less Consumption C].     (14)

 

One can save neither more nor less than what one earns less what one spends. In aggregate that saving MUST be invested in new capital goods so as to clear the market of all its production. It is astounding that for sixty years since the SNA was introduced the world has worked with a system of national accounts that is so obviously faulty. Conceptually, those who purchase capital goods have an accumulated debt to employees and businesses, not to the banking system.  When employees and businesses accumulate non-productive ‘‘savings” an equivalent amount of bank debt must be created to replace those “savings”.

 

 (b) The current account surplus or deficit must be reflected on both sides of the  National income and outlay account. The current account is simply a means of settling foreign exchange transactions. All that happens is that the mix of consumption goods and capital goods in the productive economy changes. 

 

The creditor country swaps surplus consumption goods for an equal amount of capital goods while the debtor country swaps some of its capital goods for surplus consumption goods and to pay for other remittances abroad on the current account. In this process the debtor country initially creates new debt to pay for the extra consumption and ends up with an equal sum of deposits received from the sale of its capital goods to balance the foreign exchange transactions. When the banks’ net foreign currency assets are negative they have “borrowed” foreign currency to settle their foreign exchange requirements. In that case, foreign ownership of the domestic economy that would otherwise be manifested in the sale of domestic assets and corresponding increase in domestic deposits, has been replaced by foreign currency “debt” in the form of bonds and commercial paper. It is a liability that leaves the domestic economy especially vulnerable to the expectations of foreign lenders.

 

 (c) The SNA has persisted in using depreciation (consumption of fixed capital) instead of principal repayments in the National income and outlay account.  It is hard to believe the economics fraternity at large did not know depreciation has little to do with the cash flow that describes incomes and outlay. Depreciation is not a cash flow. It might be relevant to estimating wealth but has nothing to do with income or expenditure despite its being used in business profit and loss accounts. 

 

The use of depreciation for measuring economic success has been catastrophic for the world economy. As depreciation rates have been raised, short term profit, and as a result equity values and capital gains, have increased at the cost of lower  productive Saving and Investment. 

 

This paper is thought to be the first to identify the link between business profit-seeking and declining world economic performance through the depreciation mechanism. Higher depreciation allowances mean higher principal repayments and higher repayments mean less saving, lower net investment and lower measured GDP growth.

 

A second major influence on repayments is population mobility. As people move around much more than they used to the average life of household mortgages has decreased. Typical table mortgages have much smaller principal repayments at the start of a long-term mortgage than they have later in the life of the mortgage. The mortgage repayment rate underpins most of the “average” repayment of 1.23 times depreciation used in this paper.

 

(d) By convention, the SNA counts increases in inventory (stocks of consumption goods) in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). That is understandable if the increases result from population growth or inflation. Otherwise, they represent a market failure and a loss to the economy. Consumption prices have been too high to clear the market of all the available production. That means future sales must be discounted to clear the increase in inventory, and that, in turn, gives it a low or even zero economic value.

 

For the purposes of the calculations included in this paper the increase in inventory has been arbitrarily set at zero and the gross operating surplus reduced by the same amount. That also reduces the National Disposable Income (DI).

 

(e) The “balance on external goods and services” in the gross domestic product and expenditure account of the SNA must be deducted from the gross operating surplus when calculating National disposable income (NDI). This is to enable the full current account offset in (b) above to be recorded on both sides of the account. The National Accounts set out in the appendices of the UN protocols therefore need to be systematically reviewed and corrected.

 

Figure 7 shows that the use of revisions (a) to (e) in section 8 for the National income and outlay account yield a NDI for New Zealand that more or less matches the existing DI produced by the national accounts until 2005. Figure 7 is preliminary because it is calibrated against the depreciation figures recorded in the existing SNA accounts.

 

The major change is not to GDP or to DI but to prospective policy options for the future. This paper reveals New Zealand’s official domestic economic measurements may be seriously out of line with economic reality. The changes proposed in this paper may contribute to correcting those measurements.  

 

The existing fixation on non-productive saving in New Zealand and elsewhere provides ample proof of the lack of understanding amongst economists about the nature of saving in a debt-based system. In most countries except Japan, the monetary aggregate (M3-repos) – (M1-M0) that approximately represents the total unearned income (Ms+Dca+Db) in the debt model is less than, (and, on the face of it, should be less than) the GDP. Figures 4 and 5 show that the decline in Saving for productive investment in New Zealand is structural. Productive investment has, according to the trend line, decreased from about 12% of GDP in 1962 to about 4% of GDP in 2010.

 

On the face of it, GDP cannot increase faster than the Saving rate, so improving economic performance means increasing transaction deposits (My in the debt model) by simultaneously increasing incomes and production.

 

The decline in Saving in the present financial system is due to the increase in depreciation rates, moderated by changing population mobility. While some of that can be attributed to changing technology and rapid obsolescence, the main contributor has been the self-interest embodied in business focus on short-term profit and the accompanying permissive regulatory framework that has made high depreciation rates (and short product durability) possible.

 

Aggregate economic performance cannot be improved without changing the underlying business and banking philosophy in favour of longer-term national growth objectives. 

 

The comments on the New Zealand Savings Working Group (SWG) report in Appendix 2 illustrate very well how business self-interest presently takes priority over the national interest. The “Saving” promoted by SWG and included in the existing SNA format is economic suicide because, as shown in Figure 6, it adds nothing to the economy while directly adding to asset inflation, consumer debt, higher inventories, wage stagnation, increased unemployment and recession.

 

In the absence of business leadership, the New Zealand government will have to play the primary regulatory role in adopting a sensible savings and growth plan for New Zealand.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

 

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,  “Modern Money Mechanics:  workbook on Bank Reserves and Deposit Expansion”  Public Information Centre, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,  downloaded 28/4/05.

 

International Monetary Fund, 2010a  “Balance of Payments and International  Investment Position Manual”  Sixth edition (BOPM6), January 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/bopman6.htm

 

International Monetary Fund, 2010b , Blanchard O, Dell’Ariccia G, Mauro P, “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy”, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/03, February 12, 2010.

 

Kerin, Paul (2009)  “Forced saving reduces national savings and investment”, The Australian, 2/3/2009.

 

New Zealand Treasury, 2011, “Saving New Zealand: Reducing Vulnerabilities and barriers to Growth and Prosperity”, Savings Working Group Final Report to the Minister of Finance, January, 2011

 

OECD,  Manual 2009,  “Measuring Capital”,  2nd Edition. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/16/43734711.pdf

 

Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1998, Sean Collins, Francisco Nadal Da Simone, David Hargreaves,  “The Current Account Balance: an analysis of the issues” Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Vol 61, No 1, March 1998.

 

Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2001, Ian Woolford, Micahel Reddell and Sean Comber “International capital flows, external debt and New Zealand financial stability”, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bulletin Vol 64 No 4, December 2001

 

Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2006a, Alan Bollard, Bernard Hodgetts, Phill Briggs, Mark Smith, “Household savings and wealth in New Zealand”, paper for Alan Bollard’s presentation to INFINZ, Wellington 27 September, 2006.

 

Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2006b, Andrew Coleman “The Life-Cycle Model, Savings and Growth”, paper for Reserve Bank workshop “Housing, Savings and the Household Balance Sheet”, Wellington, 14 November 2006.

 

Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2011, “Submissions to the Savings Working Group”, November 2010, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin Vol 74 No1, March 2011.

 

Statistics New Zealand, 2006, Geoff Bascand, Jeff Cope, Diane Ramsay, “Selected Issues in the Measurement of New Zealand’s Saving(s), Paper prepared for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Workshop on Saving”, 14 November, 2006.

 

Statistics New Zealand, 2007, “Measuring Saving in the National Accounts”, Hot Off the Press, 15/11/2007.

 

Stiglitz JE, Sen Amartya, Fitoussi JP (2009), Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress:, September, 2009.

 

United Nations, 2008, “System of National Accounts 2008” (2008 SNA) Final Version,   http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/SNA2008.pdf

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

 

The author gratefully acknowledges the support, encouragement and advice of Raf Manji and the Sustento Institute and the constructive critique, editing and advice from Terry Manning and the NGO Bakens Verzet that have been crucial as this paper has evolved over the past two years.

 

 

APPENDIX 1 : DERIVATION OF THE SAVINGS FUNCTION FROM THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS.

 

In this appendix, the Gross Domestic Product and the National Income and Outlay are analysed in turn and the differences between them defined. The amount of “ Savings” can then be calculated.

 

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the world’s mot most widely used measure of economic performance. A typical definition is:

 

The total market value of goods and services produced in [a country] after deducting the cost of goods and services utilised in the process of production, but before deducting allowances for the consumption of fixed capital.” [80]

 

Emphasis is on “the total market value of goods and services” produced by the domestic economy.

 

Therefore:

 

Gross Domestic Product =  Compensation of employees (household income).

                                       + Gross operating Surplus (gross business income residual).

                                       + Taxes on production and imports less subsidies (tax included in prices).       (2)

 

“Production” as stated in the definition above is an estimated number because the gross operating surplus that is part of equation (2) is a “residual” accounting figure within that estimate. “It [the gross operating surplus] is approximately equal to accounting profit before the deduction of direct taxes, dividends and bad debts, and before the deduction of interest paid or the addition of interest received” [81].

 

“Consumption of fixed capital” as stated in the definition above is also an accounting entity that exists only on paper. It is an estimate of the reduction in the nation’s existing stock of wealth “used up” during the production process [82]. “Consumption of fixed capital” is commonly referred to as “depreciation”.

 

In practice, calculation of the GDP is usually based on expenditure, which has two main components.

 

The first main component of GDP is the sale of the goods and services produced in the domestic economy. This gives rise to what is called the “gross national expenditure” (GNE) shown in the expenditure side of all national accounts:

 

Gross National Expenditure = Final consumption (C).

                                               + Gross capital formation [83].

                                               + Change in inventories (increase in stocks).                                           (3)

                                              

The second main component of GDP is the “balance on external goods and services”. This is usually called the “balance of trade”. It is the difference between the total exports of goods and services and the total imports of goods and services. The balance of trade is added to the Gross National Expenditure to give the total “expenditure” on the gross domestic product. The balance of trade represents net surplus domestic production because exports are not, by definition, consumed domestically, while imports are.

 

Gross domestic product (GDP) = Gross national expenditure (GNE).

                   + Balance of trade (exports less imports).  

                                               +  Statistical discrepancy [84].                                                            (4)

 

[80] New Zealand Year Book 1988/89 p.809.

[81] New Zealand Year Book 1988/89 p.810.

[82] A typical definition of Consumption of fixed capital is: “The value of depreciation at ordinary rates allowed for taxation purposes, plus an estimate for the normal rate of accidental damage based on insurance claims by each industry group.”  New Zealand Year Book, 1988/89 p. 809.

[83] In orthodox terms Gross Capital Formation appears to be the same as domestic Investment while the increase in inventories is also usually treated as investment by convention rather than because they really do represent investment.

[84] Required because of errors in the GDP production and expenditure estimates even though the operating surplus is itself already a residual.

 

From equations (3) and (4) and the “expenditure on gross domestic product” side of the gross domestic product and expenditure account of the national accounts:

 

Gross Domestic Product  = Final consumption C.

                                      + Gross fixed capital formation(includes increase in stocks).

                                          + Balance of trade (exports less imports).

                                          + Statistical discrepancy.                                                                                        (5)

 

So:

 

Final Consumption C     = Gross Domestic Product.

                                            - Gross fixed capital formation(includes increase in stocks).

                                            - Balance of trade (exports less imports).

                                            - Statistical discrepancy.                                                                                        (6)

 

In orthodox economic terminology a positive balance of trade forms part of national SAVING on the current account [85]. The corresponding aggregate net income is called the “balance on the external current account” or, more simply, the Current Account balance (CA). 

 

[85] This is clear from the External Account of the National Accounts; for example Table 1.4 of the New Zealand National Accounts published by Statistics New Zealand.

 

In countries where the current account balance is positive it is made up of domestic deposits in earners’ accounts and a national foreign currency reserve that results from the sale of the surplus goods and services offshore. That foreign currency reserve is then typically “spent” as an OUTWARD CAPITAL INVESTMENT FLOW to debtor countries. This is part of the process of foreign exchange where the foreign currency earned by the country with a current account surplus is exchanged for capital goods in the debtor country. In the absence of outward capital investment flows the earners’ deposits resulting from the sale of goods and services offshore would remain in the domestic accounts in the surplus country. This would cause inflation in the domestic economy of the country that produced the surplus goods and services. There would be more deposits available than needed to consume the remaining domestic production at current prices.

 

NATIONAL INCOME AND OUTLAY (NDI)

 

Whereas the Gross Domestic Product is meant to be about the total MARKET VALUE of goods and services produced in the domestic economy, the National Disposable Income (NDI) is defined as  “The total income of [a country] residents from all sources available for final consumption or savings”. [86]  

 

The income available for “final consumption or savings” relates to the CASH FLOW in an economy. The income available for “final consumption and saving” cannot relate directly to accounting entities like the operating surplus used to calculate GDP because the operating surplus for GDP purposes is itself dependent on the consumption of fixed capital. Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation) is a book accounting entry NOT a cash flow.

 

In the national accounts National Disposable Income is related to GDP this way: [87]

 

NDI   (Income side)                =  Compensation of employees (household income).

                                                  +  Compensation of employees from rest of world.

                                                  +  Gross operating surplus.

                                                  +  Indirect taxes less subsidies (tax included in prices).

                                                  +  Investment income from the rest of the world (net).

                                                  +  Net current transfers from the rest of the world [88].

                                                  -   Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation).                                      (7)

 

Substituting GDP into NDI from equation (2) to give the SNA “Principal Aggregates”:

 

NDI                                         =  GDP.

                                                  +  Compensation of employees from rest of world.

                                                  +  Investment income from the rest of the world (net).

                                                  +  Net current transfers from the rest of the world.

                                                  -   Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation).                                               (8)

 

Now that Gross Domestic Product and the National Income and Outlay have been analysed, “Saving” can be defined.

 

[86] New Zealand Year Book 1988/89 p. 809.

[87] New Zealand National Accounts Year ended march 2010 Table 1.2  Statistics New Zealand.

[88] Current transfers from abroad (e.g. remittances) not included as factor receipts or compensation of employees from the rest of the world.

 

SAVING.

 

On the expenditure side of the National income and outlay account, Saving S is a residual figure defined as :

 

S     =  NDI – C                                                                                                                                       (1)

 

Where:

 

NDI is the National Disposable Income as set out in the national income and outlay account and

 

C  is the total final consumption expenditure also taken from the national income and outlay account.

 

Since depreciation (consumption of fixed capital) is NOT an income flow but an accounting correction for the consumption of existing wealth, NDI, as it is presented in the national accounts, cannot properly represent the dynamic financial FLOWS in the economy.  Using equation 1 and NDI (income side) equation (7):

 

Saving  S = NDI from equation (7) being:

                                        

     [ Compensation of employees (household income).

                               + Compensation of employees from rest of world.

                               + Gross operating surplus from equation (2) or (5).

                               + Indirect taxes less subsidies (tax included in prices).

                               + Investment income from the rest of the world (net).

                               + Net current transfers from the rest of the world [89].                                                 

                               -  Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation). ]               

                                       

                               -  Final Consumption C.                                                                                        (9)                                

 

[89] Current transfers from abroad (e.g. remittances) not included as factor receipts or compensation of employees from the rest of the world.

 

From the GDP derivation equations (2) and (5) above:

 

                                             Compensation of employees (household income).

                                       +    Gross operating Surplus (gross business income residual).

                                       +    Taxes on production and imports less subsidies (tax included in prices).       (2)

 

                                                 =

 

                                            Final consumption C.

                                         + Gross fixed capital formation(includes increase in stocks).

                                         + Balance of trade (exports less imports).

                                         + Statistical discrepancy.                                                                                          (5)

                   

And so:

 

Final Consumption C    =  Compensation of employees  (household income).

                                         +  Operating Surplus (gross business income residual).

                                         +  Taxes on production and imports less subsidies (tax included in prices) .

                                         -   Gross capital formation (including increase in stocks)[90].

                                         -   Balance of trade (exports less imports).                           

                                         -   Statistical discrepancy [91].                                                                             (10)

 

[90] Gross capital formation is the same as Investment -  the increase in stocks is also usually treated as investment by convention.

[91] Required because of errors in the GDP production and expenditure estimates even though the operating surplus is itself already a residual.

 

Substituting for final consumption C equation (10) into the above saving equation (9):

 

Savings S                       =  Compensation of employees (household income).

                                         +  Compensation of employees from rest of world.

                                         +  Operating Surplus (gross business income residual).

                                         +  Indirect taxes less subsidies (tax included in prices).

                                         +  Investment income from the rest of the world  (net) [92].

                                         +  Net current transfers from the rest of the world [93].

                                         -   Consumption of fixed capital   (depreciation).

                                         -   Compensation of employees.

                                         -   Operating Surplus (gross business income residual).

                                         -   Indirect taxes less subsidies   (tax included in prices).

                                         +  Gross capital formation (including increase in stocks) [94].

                                         +  Balance of trade (exports – imports).                            

                                         +  Statistical discrepancy [95].                                                                                (11)

 

[92] Net income from abroad in the form of interest, dividends rent and royalties. NZYB op. cit. p.811.

[93] Current transfers from abroad (e.g. remittances) not included as factor receipts. NZYB op. cit. p.811.

[94] Gross capital formation is the same as Investment -  the increase in stocks is also usually treated as investment by convention.

[95] Required because of errors in the GDP production and expenditure estimates even though the operating surplus is itself already a residual.

 

The current account surplus  (CA), the balance on the current account, is defined as :

 

CA [96]                          =  Balance of trade (exports less imports).    

                                          +  Compensation of employees from rest of world (net).                   

                                          +  Investment income from the rest of the world (net).

                                          +  Net current transfers from the rest of the world.                                           (12)

 

So, according to the SNA and substituting the balance on current account (the right hand side of equation (12) into equation (11) for Saving:

 

Saving S                           =  Current account surplus (CA).

                                           +  Gross capital formation (including increase in stocks) [97].

                                           -   Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation).

                                           +  Statistical discrepancy [98].                                                                     (13)

 

[96] New Zealand National Accounts Year ended March 2010. Table 1.4  [Statistics New Zealand].

[97] Gross capital formation is the same as Investment -  the increase in stocks is also usually treated as investment by convention

[98] Required because of errors in the GDP production and expenditure estimates even though the operating surplus is itself already a residual.

 

The saving figure S in the national accounts is a net figure because depreciation has been deducted. Gross Saving is obtained by adding back the depreciation figure. 

 

There is no place in Saving S for “savings" deposits like the Cullen Superannuation Fund and Kiwisaver in New Zealand. They are for the most part invested outside New Zealand or in non-productive investments. Therefore they do not qualify as components of S.

 

 

APPENDIX 2.  COMMENTS ON THE NEW ZEALAND SAVINGS WORKING GROUP  (SWG) REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF FINANCE JANUARY 2011.

 

In January 2011 a Savings Working Group (hereafter SWG) appointed by the New Zealand government released a major report on savings in New Zealand entitled: “Saving New Zealand:  Reducing Vulnerabilities and Barriers to Growth and Prosperity.”

 

The report is more than 150 pages long but fails to get to the core of the savings issue as set out in this paper.

 

This section offers some brief comments on the report.

 

(1) SWG records that measured household “saving” in New Zealand is now negative. That is because households have long been induced through advertising to consume more than they can afford while at the same time they are bearing a disproportionate share of the new bank debt that must replace the transfer of deposit interest to the investment sector as set out in the debt model referred to in section 2.

 

(2) Nowhere in the SWG report is the role of domestic bank debt in investment adequately dealt with. Household debt is discussed on page 8 but no effort is made to explain what has caused the debt explosion around the world. The debt model fully explains this process. 

 

(3) The SWG recommendation to increase national “saving” by 2 to 3% is arbitrary. The authors first need to understand what national “saving” in the SNA is. They show little sign they understand the system mechanics that give rise to the official figures. Nor do they properly distinguish between the nature of productive investment and the nature of non-productive investment that destroys the productive economy instead of stimulating it.

 

(4) In orthodox theory all investment is funded from "saving" according to SWG Box 11. There, net investment (Inet) is equal to National saving S (the saving figure that appears as a residual in the national accounts) + Foreign investment (Srow) from the rest of the world (the current account deficit return capital flow). This paper shows that neither of those items represents saving in the sense of providing the funding base for productive investment. Instead, in the debt system, debt is initially used to produce capital goods and those goods are then "consumed" in the sense of being paid for out of productive economy incomes. Conceptually, the orthodox saving = investment involves the exchange of production entitlements within the productive sector. Producers own the part of the capital goods they produce and, through bank intermediation, they sell their share to others wishing to buy it

 

(5) The main problem with treating the current account surplus Srow referred to by SWG as an investment is that it represents a return capital flow. This return flow arises from consumer debt taken on in the debtor country to pay for extra consumption of imported goods and services. Some of the Srow amount may be used for productive investment and some of it is used as foreign direct investment (FDI) to buy existing non-productive assets like residential land and houses. Most Srow is used to buy existing assets. The sellers of those assets do not always use their resulting deposits for productive investment in New Zealand. The same is true of equity investments and company mergers and buyouts. Some capital inflows from abroad that are used for things like corporate bonds and new business floats may, on the other hand, serve to increase domestic production in New Zealand. So, while Srow may represent foreign investment it doesn't necessarily represent productive investment.  

 

(6) Debt cannot be "saved" because it is always cheaper to repay debt than hold a "savings" deposit. Instead in the debt model deposits typically drain away from debt-holders to the investment sector as UNEARNED income that forms the deposit pool (Ms in the debt model) that operates outside of the productive economy. From the dynamic economic flow perspective of the national accounts, that drift from the productive economy to the non-productive “paper” economy appears as systemic inflation in both the income and expenditure sides of the production cycle.

 

(7) The SWG note at P.140/141 Figures 9.12 and 9.13 that real market income has actually fallen for half the population in New Zealand over the past 30 years is misleading. The real situation is much worse because SWG fails to take changed expenditure patterns into account.  For example:

 

(i) Debt servicing has increased dramatically over the years because there is so much more debt, substantially reducing the purchasing power of incomes [99].

 

(ii) Total taxation has also increased with a similar effect though some of that effect is offset for some people by higher transfer payments. Governments frequently claim the public gets "value for money" for taxation. SWG wants to make a major attack on government "productivity" because it does not share the government’s view.

 

(iii) Many goods and services previously un-priced are now priced. These effects can be estimated. The main point is that the changes all work in the same direction and reflect the dramatic shift in wealth from the poor to the rich that has taken place in recent decades [100].

 

[99] This is demonstrated graphically in papers 1 and 2 referred to at the beginning of  the introduction Section 2 of this paper.

[100] This is discussed fully in the paper  How to create stable financial systems in four complementary steps.

 

(8) Existing National “saving” S in the national accounts is made up of sector saving (household, business, government), but all three are forms of household saving. Government saving can be viewed typically as over-taxation. Business saving can be seen as retained earnings that would otherwise have been income to the entrepreneurial household sector. S is meant to reflect income that is not spent on consumption. The debt model and this paper show that in the absence of deflation it is not possible for productive income earners and businesses to "save" more of their incomes than is needed to buy the capital goods being produced unless households, in aggregate, borrow the difference. Some people can save … at someone else’s expense…. but collectively there can be no “saving” for non-productive “investment” in the paper economy without compensatory formation of new debt. Otherwise the economy will collapse because the market cannot clear. If the government and businesses "save" the household sector will correspondingly dis-save. [ SWG p.120-125].

 

(9) The question then arises why net National “Saving” S as presented in the NZ national accounts has "wobbled" through a rather wide spectrum. Over the past 30 years according to the SWG report it has varied from a low of -1.3% of GDP in 1992 to a high of 5.4% of GDP in 2002 and 2004 at the beginning of the last expansion.  

 

The main answer is that the SNA itself is wrong. The basic formula S = NDI-C, equation 1 in this paper, (discussed in the text around P.119 and in Table 3 of the SWG report) describes a FLOW of funds. But the consumption of fixed capital used for calculations in the SNA is NOT a flow. It refers to the annual reduction in the STOCK of wealth as it is "used up". The dynamic interpretation is acknowledged by SWG at p. 114: "At its simplest, saving is a flow concept and is measured as the difference between income and expenditure (or consumption)".  Taking SWG at its word, capital repayments, the FLOW of funds through the national accounts, should be used, NOT depreciation as in the national accounts.

 

(10) Over the past 60 years or so since the SNA was developed, the erroneous use of depreciation has caused irreconcilable problems around economic theory and policy, and the whole concept of savings in theory and their measurement needs to be revisited. The economics profession will need to accept the principle that  “saving” that is not used for productive investment withdraws money from circulation and causes either deflation or economic contraction. Since virtually every country has some degree of inflation in that the money supply is increasing relative to production, the world must be dis-saving, that is, taking on more and more debt to prop up the non-productive investment sector, just as the debt model indicates.

 

(11) Money has been widely hoarded for many centuries, but that was when there was little or no debt. If too many people hoarded too much money there would be very little cash in circulation and prices would fall. There is plenty of evidence the original Fisher equation applied well to cash economies, but it is difficult to prove conclusively because of the potential margins of cumulative error in the painstakingly assessed macroeconomic aggregates. The economy was still largely run on cash when the SNA was established at the end of World War II. It was common to stash some cash away. Even now, most of the NZ$ 3.6b cash "in circulation" in NZ  (NZ$ 800 per person!) seems to be hoarded in the "black" market. The best way to encourage "saving" would be to abolish the debt system and use electronic cash E-notes instead. Hoarded E-notes would be replaced with new ones to maintain the price level.  Surplus E-notes could be removed by taxation. The key difference is that there is no debt to repay and no interest on the debt, and so the saving would be real.

 

(12) Standard banking practice requires principal repayments greater than the depreciation rate. Otherwise there could still be debt outstanding after the asset, against which the loan is often raised, has reached the end of its useful life. At that point there would be no loan security left. For that reason, in NZ, home mortgages do not usually go beyond 30 years these days while the depreciation rate is typically around 3%. As discussed in this paper, the National Accounts are substantially UNDERCOUNTING the repayment cash flow by using depreciation instead of principal repayments. SWG records an "average" figure for savings S in recent decades in New Zealand of 2.9% of GDP. In today's terms, (with GDP of around NZ$ 190 b.) that's around NZ$ 5.5 billion. That amounts to 23% on average of the "measured" consumption of fixed capital recorded in the SNA accounts.  

 

(13) It is reasonable to expect principal repayments to run at about 23% above the depreciation figure in New Zealand. Recording this accurately means aggregating capital repayments from bank accounts. That is already possible because each bank loan account lists repayments separately for tax purposes.

 

(14) There will be some cyclical variation in repayments, particularly during recessions when the repayments are likely to be higher because of defaults and bank losses. This seems to have been the case in NZ between 1990 and 1993. Similarly, repayments might be lower in times of rapid expansion as seems to have been the case in the dotcom boom 2000-2002. There is no particular reason why the capital repayments percentage would be the same country to country, but Australia has the same banks as New Zealand does so the repayment relationship there should be much the same. 

 

(15) SWG argues for more “saving” as well as a budget surplus. It proposes that government should "increase productivity by 2% a year for five years and 1% thereafter" (p.8) to achieve the surplus. It does all this is while arguing later in the paper for extra bureaucracy that is supposed to increase efficiency. It is very difficult to improve efficiency in a service-dominated economy that isn't based on industry or agriculture where science and technology play a major role. There can be improvement in service delivery (in health for example; better equipment, shorter hospital stays and so on) but at the basic level public interaction remains mostly 1:1 and net efficiency gains will always be marginal.  

 

The SWG report refers at Box 3 pp. 65-72 to "real public services per capita" but it is not clear what that term means. If existing efficiency measurement is as bad as SWG claims, it is difficult to see how SWG could be so sure existing government performance is so poor. Nowhere does SWG discuss whether improved government productivity might be achieved by increasing services (and costs) following the principle that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, instead of by continually reducing them.

 

(16) SWG pays little attention to what people who “save”, “save” for, assuming they could save. SWG says savings is primarily for the middle-income group to be able to have the same quality of life in retirement enjoyed while working. Saving is, apparently, viewed as a reserve for future consumption, not for productive investment. That means future inflation would be caused by the reintroduction of funds into circulation for consumption. It would then tend to reverse the deflationary tendency caused by the withdrawal of funds for “saving” in the first place. Lower income groups are supposed to be satisfied with national superannuation. But SWG fails to explain why people who have struggled throughout their working lives shouldn’t have something BETTER to look forward to. When household “saving” is invested in pension funds and other savings institutions that in turn invest mostly in existing assets, the real winners from “saving” would be the elite who hold shares and directorships in companies and speculators, not those with wage and salary incomes. The report itself acknowledges most people are no better off in New Zealand than they were 30 years ago. SWG offers no hope at all that that trend will change as a result of their recommendations. Their recommendations boil down to proposals to help the elite rather than the country as a whole. SWG admits this when it writes "The SWG reviewed business saving, and encourages steps that will make business more profitable as this would lead to higher business saving".  

 

(17) SWG claims "The fastest way to stabilise the NFL (Net foreign liabilities)-GDP ratio is to return the fiscal balance to surplus earlier than current projections".

 

The New Zealand Labour government ran large fiscal surpluses. At the same time there were persistent record current account deficits. The SWG position is therefore ideological. If their "argument" were applied it would make more sense for the government to run very large deficits. And on p.12 SWG says: "Reducing borrowing is - to some extent - an alternative means of increasing saving and wealth". There is no comment on how saving and wealth can be increased in a debt-based economy without increasing debt.

 

SWG may be referring to foreign borrowing. If so, it would be inappropriate to consider inward compensatory capital flows to the debtor country as net investment because the deposits arising from it are offset by household debt as explained in this paper. That would be borrowing investment money, not saving it. Households pay for the inward capital flow by consuming more than they earn. Therefore the answer to the NFL v GDP problem is to correct the exchange rate. Quoting the IMF (p.36 of the SWG report) saying the exchange rate for the New Zealand dollar needs to depreciate by 20% or 25% and that it will take 15 years to get NFL down to 75% of GDP is not good enough. It is not good enough because the New Zealand dollar exchange rate has already fluctuated by 20% or more year on year anyway!  

 

Productive investment comes from new debt created during the production cycle itself that is then notionally retired when the business operating surplus is distributed and the capital goods are “sold”. This paper shows that foreign “saving”, (SWG calls it Srow), plays no relevant part in productive investment and that saving and productive investment are both independent of the current account.

 

(18) SWG writes at p.40: "The build up of NFL and the inflation pressure from the imbalance between domestic investment and saving are the most likely explanations for New Zealand's high interest rates and cost of capital". 

 

According to orthodox theory there can be no such imbalance because “Savings equals Investment”. SWG admits in reality in the quote that it doesn't have an explanation for New Zealand's high interest rates even though the answer is self-evident. The build up of NFL makes New Zealand vulnerable because the interest rates that must be paid to attract the reverse capital flow on the current account have to be higher than those in the creditor country. The debtor country must also out-compete the creditor country’s other investment options. That puts a small open economy like New Zealand’s near the bottom of the pecking order.

 

The SWG does not mention the main contribution to high interest rates in New Zealand. That is the New Zealand Reserve Bank's ideological commitment to low inflation and its counterproductive use of interest rates to achieve that. If the IMF is saying New Zealand needs to get its exchange rate down, as SWG points out, one of the simplest ways of doing that is to allow higher inflation to reduce the exchange rate and get the economy moving. New Zealand seems to be stuck in an ideological vice that policy makers must surely know is contradictory. For example at p.57, SWG writes : "The consequence of financing investment using foreign funding over many years is that servicing the resulting liabilities forms a large part of the current account deficit".  Fair enough:  the immediate answer in that case should be to find a way to get interest rates down. That issue is addressed in detail in the fifth link provided in the introduction Section 2 of this paper : How to create stable financial systems in four complementary steps.

 

(19) SWG states on p.19 of its report : "The main saving issue for New Zealand is that since the early 1970's New Zealand has not had sufficient savings for its own investment purposes. Consequently, New Zealand has had to rely on foreign savings to build its capital stock".

 

The SWG statement needs to be treated with a great deal of scepticism, if not dismay. This paper shows that foreign “savings” do not usually build productive capital stock. If New Zealand did NOT over-consume causing the inward capital flows, the domestic debt and the corresponding deposits would both be lower by the same amount. New Zealanders would still own their own country. The underlying issue isn't about investment - it is about ownership. The same amount of domestic investment would still bring about the same level of domestic production and the corresponding income would be available for domestic consumption. Current account deficits "force" high cost return capital flows onto the debtor country as described at point 18 above. 

 

(20) Nor does the SWG make sense with its comments on p.12 of its report, relating to tax rates favouring housing. Some countries such as The Netherlands have tax deductibility for mortgage payments without any sign of a housing bubble. That is because they have a lower interest rate structure and so the exponential debt expansion and growth of the non-productive investment sector is slower (see: The interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts.)  

 

Blaming immigration for rising house prices is also incorrect. Housing demand caused by new household formation affects the supply of new dwellings but it does NOT drive property prices. The land price drives property prices. Land prices reflect investment sector expansion. Any change in building costs appears in the ordinary inflation figures. The SWG recommendation to substantially reduce tax rates on non-residential investment by 5% to 10% would boost the wealth of the rich at the expense of the poor just like its recommendations on Kiwisaver and Superfund. SWG acknowledges at p.103 that home ownership is declining. Increasing tax on homeowners would make home affordability worse, not better. It would make it even more difficult for first home buyers to buy their own home than is already the case in New Zealand.

 

(21) This paper shows there is no “saving” under the SNA in terms of the cash FLOW in the economy. There is an ongoing structural transfer of wealth from those holding debt to those with deposits in the banking system. SWG  (pp. 26-29) appears to be confused in its understanding of the processes taking place in the debt based economy. Households can't rapidly increase their debt and be saving at the same time. Instead, the cost of their debt SERVICING shifts claims on wealth to the non-productive investment sector. That leaves ever more deposits in the “paper” economy. More money in the “paper” economy means investment prices there will rise. This conforms to the Fisher equation in its purest form. The secondary effect for homeowners is that their property "values" go up and their nominal wealth may go up despite their dis-saving. The effect for first home buyers throughout most of the industrialised world is that there is no way a single-earner, and sometimes even a household with two incomes, can afford to buy a house.

 

(22) SWG discusses the PAYGO (“pay as you go”) superannuation system versus SAYGO (“save as you go” funded schemes, as in Holland) at great length (p.32 and around p.84 on) but nowhere does it mention the moral and financial hazard of SAYGO which is pushed out into the distant future. An example of the risk involved is the destruction of US 401k pension funds there that has left many millions without retirement income.  

 

There are issues of intergenerational equity with SAYGO systems too, where the current generation would be (indirectly) subsidising later ones. The same investment (SAYGO) error is being perpetuated in New Zealand where Kiwisaver investments have to be made through private investment funds at relatively high cost. SWG wants to extend that programme (p.91) by way of an all-in opt-out rule. This would mean that employees are automatically registered in the scheme and must quickly apply to withdraw if they do not want to participate. This is the opposite of the current Kiwisaver opt-in rules. Many workers do NOT have good information available to make a balanced choice on whether to opt in or opt out. Most new workers are neither mature enough nor experienced enough to make such long-term decisions. Self – investing where individuals can manage their own scheme as long as they satisfy the complex regulatory framework, as SWG proposes to allow, would potentially leave workers even worse off than they are already.

 

(23) At p.36 of its report, SWG writes "The relationships between main local banks and their parents in Australia, as well as the Reserve Bank's new liquidity policy, have helped ensure that the funding lines of domestic banks have remained open in spite of problems credit markets". 

 

SWG’s statement is inaccurate. The banks have not “remained open” for households and consumers. Their extra bank spread in recent years largely created the recession in New Zealand [101].  The banks are still restraining the housing market by insisting on tough borrowing criteria. That may be due to the banks’ preparations for the implementation of the Basel III regulatory framework that comes into effect from 2012 and requires progressive increases in capital ratios.

 

(24) SWG refers (pp. 59-64) to NZIER (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research) modelling work on export performance saving, interest and GDP. That work is unhelpful because it assumes 5% nominal GDP growth that is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. Under the existing economic policy instruments, increases in interest rates would collapse the economy before it could sustain a 5% growth rate [102].

 

 

 (25) Box 4, p. 76 of the SWG report is misleading because the cases referred to in the box do not exist. New Zealand has both income tax (mostly much less than 33% for ordinary people) AND GST.  The example given by SWG also assumes people will spend their "savings" on consumption, whereas many people "save" for an investment like a home, often for the purchase of an existing one. 

 

Tax changes do not necessarily change national “saving" as it is defined either, as the SWG claims on p. 77. This is because the demand for imported goods and services is not necessarily a direct function of net disposable income. Box 5 is supposed to compare the different tax regimes for superannuation.  However, it doesn't even attempt to compare the EET (exempt income, exempt fund earning, taxed on withdrawal) system as in Holland with the TTE (taxed income, taxed fund earning, tax-free withdrawal) system applied in New Zealand. Many EET countries have very high marginal tax rates whereas New Zealand does not. By arguing for an EET tax system SWG is really arguing for vast tax relief for the rich. As an example, the SWG, at p.82  "Finds it incongruous that income from the simplest saving products - bank deposits or loans- face the highest real effective income tax rates in NZ". The statement is fundamentally incorrect. There is no basis for assuming deposit interest is taxed at the marginal income tax rate. It is just income like any other income, and, in New Zealand, the withholding tax is in practice “adjusted” when a tax return is filed. The final tax on the interest is the average tax paid on ALL the income.

 

(26) At p.134 of its report SWG notes that: "Household borrowing has been a major contributor to the lift in New Zealand's overseas debt levels, as much of it is secured against property".  So what?  If households did not over-consume, their debt would be lower but there still would not be any “saving”. People borrow to fund the current account deficit because they DON'T have savings, not because they do! 

  

END APPENDIX  2.

 

For more information on monetary reform :

 

NEW Capital is debt.

 

NEW Comments on the IMF (Benes and Kumhof) paper “The Chicago Plan Revisited”.

 

DNA of the debt-based economy.

General summary of all papers published.(Revised edition).

How to create stable financial systems in four complementary steps. (Revised edition).

How to introduce an e-money financed virtual minimum wage system in New Zealand. (Revised edition) .

How to introduce a guaranteed minimum income in New Zealand. (Revised edition).

Interest-bearing debt system and its economic impacts. (Revised edition).

Manifesto of 95 principles of the debt-based economy.

The Manning plan for permanent debt reduction in the national economy.

Missing links between growth, saving, deposits and GDP.

Savings Myth. (Revised edition).

Unified text of the manifesto of the debt-based economy.

Using a foreign transactions surcharge (FTS) to manage the exchange rate.

 

 

(The following items have not been revised. They show the historic development of the work. )

 

Financial system mechanics explained for the first time. “The Ripple Starts Here.”

Short summary of the paper The Ripple Starts Here.

Financial system mechanics: Power-point presentation. 

 


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"Money is not the key that opens the gates of the market but the bolt that bars them."

Gesell, Silvio, The Natural Economic Order, revised English edition, Peter Owen, London 1958, page 228.


 

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